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NOTES FROM THE EDITOR

Volume III

Spring 2001

GEIST is an ever evolving journal sponsored by San Jose State
University's Philosophy Club, The Symposium. This year is without exception, with a new editor-in-chief, new assistant editors,
and a new printer, the journal has changed fundamentally in the
corporeal sense..

However, GEIST fundamentally has not changed. It is still dedicated to giving a voice to graduate and undergraduate students,
and encouraging philosophical investigation in the world. Philosophy isaboutquestioning fundamental beliefs, questioning common sense and tempering ideas. Common sense is so often followed blindly, withoutquestioningthe integrity of these ideas that
when the philosophercomes along and places it under scrutiny it
can be disorientating to say the least. This is the spirit of philosophy,and the spirit behind this journal.
Aporia represents the essays that have been refereed, by myself
and the assistant editors, and the SJSU Symposium includes an
essay fromassistanteditor Scott Stroud. I also encouragepeople
to respond to any of the essays included. They will be printed in
next yearsjournal, under Reflections .
I would like to thank the assistanteditors and the former editor of
GEIST for withouttheirassistance,thisjournal would not be. It is

not withouta great deal of sacrificeof time, when time is so valuable in the semester, that their services are required the most. I
would also like thank the SJSU Philosophy Department, for standing by GEIST and assuring the publication of this journal.
This journal is always a work in progress, and being so, suggestions on how to improve it are always warmly accepted.
Cheers,
-w.K.Y.

ApORIA

Communicating the Incommunicable
Benjamin Fanger

Brigham YoungUniversity
Butch, a Vietnam veteran 1know, could articulate
no answer to the question, "What was Vietnam like?" An
expression of sorrow, he had. But even that was vague and
insufficient. I reasoned that the horror of recalling to one's
mind the experiences of war would at least be a partial
reason for Butch's silence. Yet, if he had imparted some of
his recollection in the form of words and syntax, would he
have imparted anything at all equal to what he had experienced?
Much of what we experience is at a sub-linguistic
level. Feelings toward others are seldom expressible in
words alone-yet they are often mutually understood
implicitly by each subject involved. Ethical and religious
inclinations are also modes of existence difficulL to communicate or justify with language. Indeed, there are numerous
kinds of entities in our experience that do not lend themselves to formulation in sets of propositions. The experience us one's "experience of' is wholly different than the
experience as viewed by an external observer. Love as
viewed by the physician is a physiological condition of her
patient. But for the patient, as he knows it, love is inexpressible.
This is not to say that words are in any way useless.
Words, as direct communication, maintain the capacity to
carry information from one individual to another for most
practical purposes. Facial and other forms of expression
carry still more. But how is it possible to communicate the
subjective as the subjective? How does one communicate
experience except in its subjective form as an experience of
something? Certainly this cannot be achieved by cramming
the subjective into judgments such as "x =v: and then
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speaking or writing it to another individual.
Through both philosophy and method, Soren
Kierkegaard and Socrates impart a valuable response to the
issue of efficacious subject-to-subject communication.
They recognize that certain knowledge or "essential truth,"
as Kierkegaard calls it, cannot be passed from one individual to another by any direct means of communication.
They suggest, however, that forms of indirect communica tion such as maieutic' stimulation of the other individual
allow one subject to influence or help another in such a
way that the latter attains important knowledge or experience subjectively.

The Problem in Husserlian Terms'
Greater explication of the problem of inter-subjective communication is necessary before proceeding to the
responses of Kierkegaard and Socrates. Put in Husserlian
terms, some aspects of the difficulty of communicating
subjective experience become quite vivid.' The fact that
there are many things that can be effectively communicated
objectively is undisputed. But that there are some things
that cannot be communicated, in their entirety, through
objective propositions is made clear by Husserl's phenomenological study. For Husserl, the very most fundamental
parts of consciousness are pre-predicative. They are the
"objects-about-which" that give content to the simplest
judgments we make. These parts of experience are intuited" in immediacy-not even yet as objects. No syntax
accompanies these intuitions, and therefore no real direct
communication of them is possible.
The theory of prepredicative experience, of
precisely that which gives in advance the
most original substrates in objective selfevidence, is the proper first element of the
phenomenological theory of judgment. The
investigation must begin with the
prepredicative consciousness of experience
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and, going on from there, pursue development of self-evidences at higher levels
(Husserl 27).
We begin at the "pre-predicative consciousness of experience," because such experience is the most fundamental
level of consciousness that slill contains meaning. Prepredicative experiences give us meaning before syntax;
they might even be said to be pre-predicative knowledge.
Thus OUf problem (which does not seem to be where
Husserl intended to lead us): How does one communicate
the pre-predicative parts of experience? In a word, how
does one communicate redness as experienced without
making the recipient of communication the subject of
experience?
We normally attempt to communicate the incommunicable through signs. We scratch lines on a page, call
them words, and expect the reader to know exactly what we
mean . Or we make noises and call it speech-speech that
is meant to signify intricate subjective feelings and experiences . But signs are empty. They are insufficient to convey the meaning of that which they mean, without the
hearer or reader having some sort of subjective experience
to fill" the sign. Take love, for instance. Although we
could define it as this or that, the word "love" is a filled
intention only when experienced subjectively. Our reasons
for acting ethically-conscience, for example-also evade
objective expression . These intentions are empty without
something more than a proposition like, "x =y U z "
Such emptiness in a sign for the observer who lacks
experience is due to the fact that signs can function in the
absence of that which they signify-a word functions
without the substrate's presence. In making the distinction
between signifier and signified, Husserl seems to have
hoped to make possible a bridge between the two, or at
least a founding of sign in one's experience of the signified.
John Caputo explains this point:
[This] worried Edmund Husserl, who
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wanted to return the intention to its fulfill ment, to fill the sign with the intuitive
presence of the signified, in order to avoid
the "crisis" precipitated by the absence of
intuition (197) .
But just as intuition is an experience of the object had by an
individual person, bringing intuition back into the picture
makes a mean ingful sign nothing less than a sign of one's
own subjective experiences.
In his references to the pre-predicative, Husserl
seems only to be speaking of our perceptions of simple
things like color ("redness," for example). But unless his
"substrates" include the more subjective categories, such as
emotions, our problem of inter-subjective communication
does not lie exclusively in Husserl's phenomenology.
Anything that is impossible to coml~unicate linguistically
adds to the problem. Now, one might reasonably object
that the seeming impossibility of communicating certain
subjective things to another person is not a problem at all
because communication of such things is unwantedsecrets not kept are not secrets. Yet a look at the different
types of the problem may lead such an objector to think
twice. First, the practical matters of living with other
subjects demand inter-subjective communication of some
sort. Having common subjective experiences seems to be a
precondition for understanding another individual. Contact
with individuals that lack life experiences similar to ours
makes intolerance an easy temptation .
On the other hand, philosophical matte rs are influenced by our inability to communicate subjective experience. Particularly in the ethical and religious areas of
philosophy, the individual experiences feelings or inclinations as to what seems right. Often, another thing just feels
less ethical. Sometimes it seems that one's objective
ethical reasoning is really only an ad hoc attempt to justify
an ethics that is, in truth, based only on subjective inclina-

7

GEIST

tions. Yet how can we explain such inclinations to another
in justification of our position without somehow helping
her step into our shoes? Even the process of contemplating
a math problem and then coming to a conclusion on one's
own leaves the student with a more "filled intention" of the
meaning and significance of the conclusion than another
student who just sees the answer at the back of the book.
Right answers might work, but without tying the answer to
some experience of inner reasoning, another false conclusion mightjust as easily replace it.

Introduction to Indirect Communication
If direct communication entails objective representation of what is meant, and the problem with direct communication between individuals through language or other
means lies in the fact that it is objective, then the answer (if
there is one) must be indirect communication. But such
indirect communication is not necessarily to be found in
non-linguistic communication like gestures or facial expressions. Even in these, some direct proposition such as,
"I am sad," is often communicated implicitly. In indirect
communication, the medium of communication used
(whether words or other forms) is not so important as what
the recipient of communication is subjectively related to.
For indirect communication to occur, the other person must
be the subject huving the experience or finding the knowledge-not the student simply hearing the authoritative"x =
y' conclusions of the teacher.
With indirect communication, the direct relationship between initiator and recipient, author and reader,
speaker and listener, is somehow severed. The two individuals are interposed. The recipient's relationship rests
with an intermediary, not with the initiator. When 1 want
my wife to see the sunset, I point toward it and instigate a
relationship of experience between her and the sunset. The
sunset is the intermediary that is the source of both her and
my experience. If I read Cmcher In the Rye and receive a
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more profound understanding of purity, I place the other
person in a relationship with the book as reader to communicate what I had subjectively experienced. In some cases,
through posing hypothetical possibilities, I might place the
other person in a relationship with his own mind-he
reasons and experiences the process of an internal dialectic
to the end that his apprehension of the conclusion is often
filled, as Husser! would say, in a way that is similar to
mine. I have communicated subjectivity.
The obvious dilemma that always follows this sort
of indirect communication is the lack of guarantee that the
other's experience of the intermediary is exactly like one's
own. Indeed, that it would be exactly the same is impossible because, as a subject, the other person is part of the
equation of experience. She is a variable. But a picture is
still worth a thousand words. In theend, allowing the other
to personally experience what one experiences must be
more effective than objective communication of the subjective knowledge. While the indirect process ideally entails a
relationship only between the other person and the object
of experience, a direct communication of the object would
include the object, the communicator, the sign, and the
other.

Answers in Kierkegaard"
Kierkegaard attempts a form of indirect
communication that, in many respects, is after the manner
of maieutic stimulation. His own ideas on indirect
communication seem particularly similar to what one of his
pseudonyms, Johannes Climacus, sets forth in Concluding
Unscientific Postscript.' Clirnacus believes that for the
existing human, subjectivity is the truth," and cannot be
communicated except through indirect means. Objective
propositions and judgments yield no truth about the
individual's existence as a subject. Therefore, for
Climacus, there is an inverse relat ionship between objective
certainty and importance because existence and decisions
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in existence are paramount.
Climacus asks, "Now, then, which of the ways is the
way of truth for the existing spirit?" (193) .9 And then he
responds:
The way to be commended is naturally the one that
especially emphasizes what it means to exist. [But the] way
of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into
something accidental and thereby turns existence into an
indifferent, vanishing something (193).
Objectivity throws existence out of the picture. For
Climacus, when it comes to questions of ethics, religion
and existence, there is no language that can serve to objectively mediate two individuals, as there is with mathematics
or logic. Climacus further explains that existential truth or
knowledge about how to exist is the only essential truth:
Therefore, only ethical and ethical-religious
knowing is essential knowing. But all
ethical and all ethical-religious knowing is

essenti<IJly related to the existence of the
knower (198, my emphasis).
How am I to live? What decisions should I make? Whom
or what should I come.into a relationship with? In a word,
how should I exist? These are the "essential" questions that
precede all others for Climacus, and the one thing common
to each is the word, "1."
To describe one aspect of indirect communication,
Climacus uses the term, "double- reflection." In one sense,
double-reflection refers to the reflection made by each of
the two subjects involved in any communication. In the
first reflection, the communicator inwardly reflects and
appropriates the existential knowledge-he makes it part of
his existence. In the second reflection, the recipient of the
communication experiences the same subjective process as
he too appropriates the knowledge through his existence.
As Climacus puts it, "The reflection of inwardness is the
subjective thinker's double-reflection" (73) . In another
sense, however, double-reflection seems to refer to the
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outward nature of the word or sign that is communicated,
and the inward action of appropriation on the part of the
recipient. The word is first communicated, and thus in the
first reflection the recipient has, as Husserl would say, an
intention of the sign alone. But in the second reflection,
knowledge is experienced or appropriated such that the
sign is filled.
When a thought has gained its proper expression in a word, which is attained
through the first reflection, there comes the
second reflection, which bears upon the
intrinsic relation of the communication to
the communicator and renders the existing
communicator's own relation to the idea
(76).

Climacus says that to communicate in such a manner as to allow double-reflection and existential appropriation of essential knowledge in the recipient requires selfcontrol and a minimum of "meddling busyness" on the part
of the communicator. This sort of indirect communication
is a "freeing" of the other:
Just as the subjective existing thinker has set
himself free by the duplexity [of thoughtexistence], so the secret of communication
specifically hinges on setting the other free,
and for that very reason he must not communicate himself directly (74).
Indeed, if essential truth is truly essentinl, and the only way
to help another obtain such truth is by indirect means, then
the act of making the other person free by choosing to use
indirect communication (and not direct communication) is
truly a form of giving. Kierkegaard further speaks of this
point in Works ofLove:
And in love to help someone [... ] to become
himself, free, independent, his own master,
to help him stand alone-that is the greatest
beneficence r...] if, note well, the one who

11

GEIST

loves also knows how to make himself
unnoticed so that the person helped does not
become dependent on him. [.. . JThe greatest
beneficence, [which is] to help the other
stand alone, cannot be done directly (Works
274) .
Indirect communication is this giving without being there.
The communicator assists, and yet hides herself.
Now we would surely expect an advocate of indirect communication to communicate his point indirectly.
At the end of the book, Climacus makes a surprising
statement:

What I write contains the notice that everything is to be
understood in such a way that it is revoked, that the book
has not only an end but has a revocation to boot (619, my
emphasis).
Why would Climacus go through the trouble to write more
than six hundred pages of prose containing many very
difficult and ingenious ideas only to revoke the whole
book? Such contradiction of word and action leads one to
believe there is something more to this than just a flippant
change of mind. Climacus makes this apparent when,
referring to "the most pleasant of all readers," he says:
He can understand that the understanding is
a revocation-the understanding with him as
the sole reader is indeed the revocation of
the book. He can understand that to write a

book and to revoke it is not the sameas
retrsinitig hom writing it. ..(my emphasis,
621).
If he hadno reason for his adding a revocation to his writing other than just to take back what he said, then he would
have never published the book after the revocat ion. Furthermore, when Climacus says, "the understanding with
him as the sole reader is indeed the revocation of the book,"
it becomes clear that his revocation has something to do
with the reader's individuality-with the reader's subjective
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experience of the book.
Kierkegaard makes a similarly unexpected and
ironic move when, at the end of Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, he admits that all of his works that were published under pseudonymous names were actually written by
him-that the pseudonymous authors (or "imaginary
constructions," as he calls them) are in fact fictitious creations. However, he proceeds to say, ..... in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me" (626).
Indeed, this seems to be Kierkegaard's own very blatant
personal revocation of all his pseudonymous works-c-or at
least of his relation to them. He confirms,
The imaginary construction is the conscious,
teasing revocation of the communication,
which is always of importance to an existing
person who writes for existing persons, lest
the relation be changed to that of a rote
reciter who writes for rote reciters (263-264,
my emphasis).
We are left to wonder what it is about Kierkegaard
and Climacus' works that makes the authors revoke them.
After a hasty analysis, one might conclude that the authors
disagree with what they have said; that in writing the
books, they have come to understand that their ideas were
false. But, as previously mentioned, this possibility is
refuted by the fact that Kierkegaard published the works.
Such a conclusion can be made only if we are talking about
books as direct communication. But indirect communication is a whole different animal. Climacus writes:
Indirect communication makes communicating an art in a sense different from what
one ordinarily assumes it to be in supposing
that the communicator has to present the
communication to a knower, so that he can
judge it, or to a nonknower, so that he can
acquire something to know (277).
Because a person cannot directly give subjective
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knowledge or existential truth to another individual, that
individual must find or experience these on her own,
Indeed, if another person did want to help in the process,
he would have to do it in some indirect way, so as to allow
the individual the genuine responsibility of experiencing
and finding the truth subjectively,
It also became clear to me that if I wanted to communicate anything about this [what it means to exist and what
inwardness is], the main point must be that my presentation
would be made in an indirect form. That is, if inwardness
is truth, [objective] results are nothing but junk with which
we should not bother one another, and wanting to communicate results is an unnatural association of one person with
another [, ..] (242).
Essential truths cannot really be communicated-only
obtainedsubjectively. However, indirect communication
can be a means of helping the individual apprehend those
essential truths for herself. But books traditionally are
direct communication. They communicate a set of propositions directly from the author to the reader. Therefore,
unless the author, the book, or the relation between the two
is removed, any book can be said to contain direct communication.
As mentioned above, Climacus revokes his writings
explicitly. Kierkegaard does so as well by abolishing any
direct relation between himself and the words written by
his pseudonymous authors', If they did not work in this
way, they could not achieve indirect communication, and
would thus be in the precarious position of having one's
method contradict one's philosophy. Jacques Derrida refers
to Kierkegaard as "Kierkegaard-de Silentio" (Derrida
58).10 He further explains this peculiar name: "[The]
pseudonym keeps silent, it expresses the silence that is
kept. Like all pseudonyms, it seems destined to keep secret
the real name as patronym, that is, the name of the father of
the work" (58). In their revocations, Climacus and
Kierkegaard dissolve the relation between the author and
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the book, and thereby force the reader alone to establish his
own subjective relationship with the book and its contents.
The heterogeneity [of authorship] must
definitely be maintained, that here is an
author, that objectively it is not a cause but
that it is a cause for which 1111 individunlhns
stood alone, suffered, etc. (Entries 145, my
emphasis).
Thus, by maintaining heterogeneity in authorship, the
author is "not a cause" of certain propositions being accepted by the reader-rather, he is the cause of the reader
standing alone and contemplating the contents of the book
in such a way that he might find some essential truth
subjectively. He betrays the reader into a relationship with
the truth such that it becomes the reader's own truth.
Therefore, through revocation and pseudonymous
evasion,Climacus and Kierkegaard allow the reader space
to come to her own conclusions and have her own experiences, which will make the apprehension of essential truth
possible. Climacus says that the "imaginary construction"
of existential possibilitiesor pseudonymous authors, "establishes a chasmic gap between the reader and the author
and fixes the separation of inwardness between them, so
that a direct understanding is made impossible" (263).
Furthermore:
With imaginary construction [.. .] If what is
said is earnestness to the writer, he keeps the
earnestness essentially to himself. If the
recipient interprets it as earnestness, he does
it essentially by himself... The being-inbetween of the imaginaryconstruction
encourages the inwardness of the two away
from each other in inwardness (264).
Upon realizing that there is no author that takes credit for
what is said in the book, the reader is forced away from
making statements that begin with, "The author argues that
x," and forced into making statements (if she makes any at
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all) that begin with, "1 believe that X."
This is also why Kierkegaard asks us to cite the
respective pseudonymous authors instead of him as we
refer back to his works. Instead of appealing to him, we
are forced to appeal to an "imaginary construction," or an
existential possibility. It is fallacious enough to base one's
argument on an appeal to authority, but to appeal to an
imegituuy authority seals one's coffin. I I Kierkegaard also
says he must be called the "author's author" (Entries 110).
Instead of quoting a set of propositions made by
Kierkegaard, we must relate ourselves subjectively to the
nature and words of an imaginary author.
For Climacus, the supreme example of an effective
indirect communicator is God. Objectively, God seems
both as silent and absent as any being can be.
No anonymous author can more slyly hide himself, and
no maieutic can more carefully recede from a direct relation than God can... and only when the single individual
turns inward into himself (consequently only in the inwardness of self activity) does he become aware and capable of
seeing God... And why is God illusive? Precisely because
he is truth and in being illusive seeks to keep a person from
untruth (243-244).
Derrida notes this idea in his discussion of Kierkegaard in
The Gift of Death. He quotes Paul's writings in Philippians
2: 12, " ... but more in my absence, work out your own
salvation with fear and trembling" (my emphasis). And as
Derrida further explains:
The disciples are asked to work towards
their salvation not in the presence (parousia)
but in the absence (apousia) of the master:
without either seeing or knowing, without
hearing the law or the reasons for the law.
Without knowing from whence the thing
comes and what awaits us, we are given over
to absolute solitude. No one can speak for
us; we must take it upon ourselves, each of

Benjamin Fanger 16
us must take it upon himself. .. (56-57, my

emphasis).
And as Kierkcgaard affirms of indirect communication,
only by hiding ourselves do we truly help the other take the
acquisition of essential knowledge "upon himself."
By the time the reader is done with the book,
Kierkegaard and Climacus have done the damage intended.
The reader has read the book, experienced it, and found the
essential truth that he will. Taking out the author strips the
reader of what he may have objectively concluded (for
there is no authority to whom he may now appeal) and
leaves him only with those beliefs and existential relations
that are supported in subjectivity alone. The act of revoking their words is essential to the method of Climacus's and
Kierkegaard's works in their support of subjectivity-an
essential component to forcing the reader back on himself
in inwardness.

Credit to Socrates"
No discussion on maieutic stimulation would be
appropriate without giving some (or perhaps all) of the
credit to Socrates. In admiration of Socrates, Kierkegaard
writes:
This noble rogue had understood in the
profound sense that the highest one human
being can do for another is to make him free,
help him stand by himself-and he had also
understood himself in understanding this,
that is, he had understood that if this is to be
done the helper must be able to make himself anonymous, must magnanimously will
to annihilate himself (Works 276, my
emphasis).
While Kierkegaard presents the recipient with a pseudonymous work, Socrates presents the interlocutor with incessant questions" ; never making a positive statement or
judgment. Socrates initiates subjective reflection in every
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conversation.
In the Thenetetus, we find the term "maieutic"
particularly applicable as Socrates compares himself to a
"midwife" who never gives birth to his own idea, but often
helps someone else in the process. In the dialogue,
Theaetetus is suffering from the mental pains of coming
close to producing a new idea, but cannot quite "give birth"
to it. Describing his art, Socrates tells Theaetetus:
Now my art of midwifery is just like theirs
in most respects. The difference is that I
attend men and not women, and that I watch
over the labor of their souls, not of their
bodies. And the most important thing about
my art is the ability to apply all possible
tests to the offspring, to determine whether
the young mind is being delivered of a
phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth
(150 b-e).
Socrates allows for the communication of essential truth by
standing aside, while the other comes to conclusions on her
own. He keeps himself from being misunderstood as the
source of knowledge by putting his interlocutor in a relationship with herself-with her own contemplation.
Now we are bound to ask how knowledge can come
from within a person who originally lacked the knowledge
obtained. Socrates addresses this question in another
example of his maieutic method in the Meno. He posits
that knowledge might come from the immortal soul's
recollection of previous Iives."
So it is in no way surprising that [the soul]
can recollect things it knew before, both
about virtue and other things. As the whole
of human nature is akin, and the soul has
learned everything, nothing prevents a man,
after recalling one thing only-a process
men call learning-[from] discovering
everything else for himself [... ] (81 c-d).
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In order to show that this is the case, he uses maieutic
stimulation on an uneducated slave boy in order to teach
him how to find the length of a side of a square twice the
size of a square for which the side length is known. Without telling the boy anything about geometry, Socrates
proceeds by means of questioning to help the boy produce
right answers. Even though he is using spoken words (as
Kierkegaard used the written word), Socrates communicates indirectly because he gives the boy no propositions as
to the facts of the matter. He allows the boy room to come
to an understanding of the geometry problem and its
conclusion on his own, through subjective processes. To be
sure, it is clear by this example that the medium of communication (whether speech, books, gestures or other methods) is not what makes communication direct or indirect.
The difference lies in the relationships-that the recipient
is put in an experiential relationship with something, rather
than being handed propositions in some form .
Whether the source of knowledge produced subjectively is truly the immortal soul, as Socrates says, make s no
difference to our discussion. Indeed, there may be some
other source. The important point in Socrates' position is
that he realizes that a method that allows subjective activity-as opposed to objective reception of signs from the
teacher in the form of judgments-permits the acquisition
of some forms of knowledge that one otherwise could not
obtain. To be sure, if one did obtain ethical ideas (or other
knowledge that is in some way based on subjective experience) from another in the form of a proposition, then the
recipient would not have really obtained that knowledge.
For Socrates, as with Kierkegaard, some inner activity or
experience is necessary on the part of the subject for the
knowledge to really mean anything to that subject. To
again use Husserlian terminology, an intention of a sign or
judgment cannot be filled except by the subject experiencing the contents in some way-whether through perception,
inner contemplation, or another experience. Socrates'
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maieutic stimulation, like Kierkegaard's pseudonyms,
forces the individual back on herself in inwardness.
Conclusion
The question of the possibility of inter-subjective
communication is indeed more difficult than we have seen
it here . And Kierkegaard and Socrates in no way eliminate
the problem. Yet in presenting us with maieutic stimulation
and the absence of an authoritative author, these philosophers do assist in our understanding of possible methods
that allow for such communication. As life itself suggests,
the lack of communication of subjective experience only
leads to intolerance and lack of understanding between
people . While we would not wish to actually experience
Vietnam so as to understand Butch, we might find something within our own life experiences that "fills our intention" of what war is. In the philosophical world as well,
certain aspects of our existence cause us to question deeply
whether "world-historical" or positivistic views of human
life are broad enough in their categories to include all of
reality-subjective as well as objective. Perhaps our
leaning toward such narrow accounts of human existence is
due primarily to the fact that subjective experience is so
difficult to communicate, while objective ideas lend themselves easily to syntactic formulation. Though the objective route leads to extensive knowledge in some form,
Kierkegard's critique reminds us that such knowledge may
not be the most essential knowledge. By presenting possible forms of indirect communication, Kierkegaard and
Socrates give us some answers as to methods that communicate subjective experience-methods that communicate
the incommunicable.
Notes
I This word has its origin in the Greek word for midwifery.
It means to elicit new ideas from another person through a
dialogue or other form of communication that allows the
person to come to conclusions through subjective, or at
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least personal, processes.
2 Exactly what Husserl says and the terms he uses sometimes vary from one of his books to the next. The
Husserlian terminology and ideas here are primarily from
the Churchill translation of Experience andJudgment,
although they may be found elsewhere.
) Husserl is used here for practical purposes of elucidating
the difficulty of some dimensions of inter-subjective communication. The intent is not to correlate Husserl's way of
handling the problem (if he does) with that of either
Kierkegaard or Socrates. To be sure, in many ways two
philosopherscould not be more dissimilar than are Husser!
and Kierkegaard (or Husserl and Socrates).
4 When Husserl uses the term "intuition," he seems to mean
what we more commonly call "perception." When he uses
the term, "intention," he seems to m~an what we more
commonly call "conception." The complex and difficult
ideas that Husserl packs in to these two words are by no
means sufficientlyembodied in the suggested synonyms.
The synonyms are simply to assist those who have never
read Husserl,
S The concept of "filled" and "empty" intentions is a
Husserlian manner of speech that refers to the depth of real
experience one has with a certain intention. For example,
one might intend or conceive the word, "red." But if one
has no prior personal experience or intuition of redness,
then the word will have little meaning-it will be empty.
6 Kierkegaard's own position is difficult to place with
precision because not only does he write with pseudonymous names, he asks us not to cite the pseudonymous
works as his. Therefore, I will try to refer to Kierkegaard
when an idea or method seems particularly his, and the
pseudonymous author when citing specific works.
7 See Evans. For this reason, this paper will focus on the
Postscript.
S This is different than saying truth is subjective. Although
some have taken Kierkegaard to mean that truth is subjec-
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tive, a close reading would indicate that this is not his
position.
t) Most citations of Kierkegaard or Climacus are from the
first of the two volumes of the Hong translation of Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fmgments.
Citations with only a page number are from volume I.
Volume 2 is the source where cited as "Entries."
10 This name is a reference to another of Kierkegaard's
pseudonyms, Johannes-de Silentio.
II Climacus asks us not to appeal to his writings lIt a// (see
Postscript 618). I recognize the irony in citing a book that
specifically states, " ... let no one bother to appeal to [the
book]." But this essay is, in some respects, in the form of
direct communication, and therefore should be expected to
appeal to the relevant sources-even if they plead for us
not to.
12 The old problem of citing Socrates and his method
remains-is it really Socrates, or just Plato's words in
Socrates' mouth? For example, Myles Burnyeat argues
persuasively that the maieutic method is Platonic and not
Socratic. While I realize that Plato's ideas are very much
involved in what is used here (especially in the doctrine of
recollection), I will leave the concern of distinguishing the
two philosophers up to the Platonic scholars and refer to
everything cited as Socrates for the sake of simplicity.
Also, all works of Plato are cited with the traditional
Stephanus page numbers.
IJ Indeed we could say that Plato undergoes the same
"anonymous" indirect communication as Kierkegaard in
that he puts his words in another's (Socrates') mouth. But
for this paper, I am content to focus on Socrates alone.
14 The Mcno is particularly troublesome (with respect to
the problem mentioned in note 12) because it seems to be a
transition dialogue between the earlier and later Platonic
dialogues that lean toward Socratic and Platonic thought,
respectively. Whether this is what Socrates would have
really said is put into question by the fact that Socrates,
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. until this point, had rarely put forth his ideas in the form of
a direct proposition as is made here regarding the doctrine
of recollection.
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Finding the Philosopher in Plato
Michael Richard

SanJoseState University
Much has been written on the questions of "being"
and "non-being" found in Plato's Sophi st and close analysis
of the dialogue reveals an investigation into the deep
structure of language. At the same time, a contextual
surface reading of the Sophist reveals issues that are key to
Plato's ethical theory and what remains of the Theory of
Forms. In addition to the Republic, one may consider the
Sophist as an indirect commentary on the true nature of the
philosopher. In contrast with the "darkness of not-being,"
where sophists takes refuge, in the Sophist one finds the
philosopher at home, in the light of reality.I

A Stranger in our Midst
The Eleatic stranger that Theodorus introduces to
Socrates as "devoted to philosophy" remains a stranger to
readers of the dialogue and to history.' He agrees to engage
in dialogue with Theaetetus, whom readers recognize from
the dialogue of that name. Because Theaetetus' role is that
of foil, the stranger occupies the position of primary interlocutor in the Sophist. Just as the views of the Athenian in
the LcIWS are Platonic, we may attribute the stranger's
views in the Sophist to Plato.' It is worthy to note why
Plato would not choose to employ Socrates in his usual
function.
First, it would be a clear conflict of interest to
portray Socrates, the presumed philosopher, as taking part
in a dialogue aimed at distinguishing his type from that of
the sophists and statesmen. 4 Rather than put Socrates on
the soapbox, Plato introduces a stranger who is known as
neither philosopher nor sophist. This choice can be seen as
the Platonic literary equivalent to the principle of independent counsel. Though Plato's disapproval shows through in
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the end, he chooses not to employ his philosopher as a
sermonizer. Secondly, though it is presumed that Socrates
would be quick to distinguish his motivations from those of
the sophists, Plato here isolates his own unique understanding of the subject at hand. One finds surprisingly naive,
charitable banter from Socrates on this subject in earlier
dialogues.' In fact, at Cratylus 429d, Socrates claims not to
welcome the challenge of a discourse on so subtle a topic
as not-being.

High Honors
The Eleatic stranger proceeds, with Theaetetus, on a
process of bifurcation in order to identify correctly the
nature of the sophist. In the sophist's sixth appearance in
the dialogue, the Eleatic stranger agrees to describe him as
a "purifier of the soul from conceits that block the way to
understanding." This appearance, according to the
stranger, was "open to doubt" as discussed in the following

passage:"

.

STRANGER: For all these reasons,
Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is
the greatest and chiefest of purifications,
and he who has not been refuted, though he
be the Great King himself, is in an awful
state of impurity; he is uninstructed and
deformed in those things in which he who
would be truly blessed ought to be fairest
and purest.
THEATETUS : Very True.
STRANGER: Well, what name shall we
give to the practitioners of this art? For my
part I shrink from calling them Sophists.
THEATETUS: Why so?
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STRANGER: For fear of ascribing to them
too high a function."
There were those that practiced this art of purification, but
they were not the sophists. To say that the sophists practiced this art would be to ascribe to the sophists too high an
honor.
A.E. Taylor disagrees with this reading of 23 I a and
instead prefers to see an expression of irony in a reversal of
the pronoun's referent where we read "for fear of ascribing
to them too high a function."? Instead, says Taylor, the
stranger means not to ascribe to those who practice this art
of purification the honorable name of sophist. I must agree
with Lewis Campbell's interpretation of this passage that
"the sophist seems scarce worthy of so high a dignity."!"
As Taylor notes, it is clear that the stranger's tentative
agreement to call the purifiers of the soul "sophists" is
simply for the sake of argument. That this characterization
is tentative remains clear at 231e where the stranger reminds Theaetetus of its doubtful status.
Again, the stranger hesitates to assign a high honor
to the sophists where none is in fact warranted. What does
warrant the honor, though, is that art of refutation as a path
toward true knowledge. The art described at 230b-d is
exactly that art practiced by Socrates, Plato's true philosopher. "The best and wisest state of mind" is that which
encourages purification through refutation. II

Accidental Clarity
To "discern" or "discriminate" in the process of purification, it is necessary to recognize whether kinds may be
divided or blended and in which way this may be accomplished." Again in the Sophist, as in the Theuetetus, Plato
introduces a metaphor of letters of the alphabet as constituent parts of a whole word or syllable. The metaphor in this
case stands to illustrate that a certain art, or science, is
necessary to discourse just as rules of grammar apply to the
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division and blending of letters in the alphabet. Inquiry
into the "science needed as a guide on the voyage of discourse" happens, as if by accident, upon the science of the
philosopher." It is only the Jover of wisdom and master of
dialectic who:
".. .discerns clearly one form everywhere
extended throughout many, where each one lies
apart, and many forms, different from one
another, embraced from without by one form,
and again one form connected in a unity
through many wholes, and many forms, entirely marked off apart. That means knowing
how to distinguish, kind by kind, in what ways
the several kinds can or cannot combine.?"
Thus we have in a nutshell what theEleatic stranger will
subsequently prove; notably, that individual things stand in
relation to one another in terms of difference, and in relation to a unity in terms of identity with one form. It is the
skill of the philosopher to recognize such combinations of
difference and identity. As I show below, the principle of
difference is central to the refutation of the relativity that
plagued the Sophist's vocation.

Relative Obscurity
A philosophy of relative values constituted the
underpinnings of the sophists' role in Athens where, as the
stranger asserts, "there is a demand" for their services. 15
As Socrates asserts in the Meno, there must clearly be a
person to whom a student might go to prepare for practical
democratic matters such as governing, management, or
entertaining properly. 16 At this time in Athens. such a need
was properly fulfilled by those Sophists offering instruction
in various fields including but not limited to the arts of
rhetoric and disputation. The philosophical inquiry of
Plato's Academy questioned neither the demand for nor the
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practicality of such instruction. Philosophy questions its
legitimacy and its morality. In a time where, given the
correct instruction, any man could rise to a position of
power, Plato recognized the need to address not just skills,
but specific values.I?
It is in this context that the question of not-being, a
question central to Plato's Sophist, arises. If not-being as
relativity does not blend with thinking and discourse, then
everything said must be true.IS This is the dark, absolute
relativity in which the sophist takes refuge. If, on the other
hand, not-being is shown to exist as an expression of
relative difference with respect to the hue nature of reality,
then philosophical discourse is possible through the illumination of that nature.
From the substantial digression at 236d-264b we
gather that the occurrence of non-being represents difference in mode of being. Instead of expressing a negative,
the Eleatic stranger has shown that non-being expresses
positive difference. As the stranger says at 257d, we may
look at this in terms of the beautiful. "The existence of the
not-beautiful is constituted by its being marked off from a
single definite kind among existing things and again set in
contrast with something that exists,"!" For example, the
most beautiful of pots can be said "not beautiful" in comparison with a beautiful maiden. Likewise, the most beautiful of earthly maidens, then, is said "not beautiful" in
comparison with a god." This juxtaposition of that which
has "definite kind among existing things" and those multiple existing things might go on ad infinitum, where notbeing in each case is shown to be relative to that which is
fixed. In other words, the existence of non-being is relative. When speaking of beauty, it is imperative to recognize the clarification made in the Sophist. Beauty is one
and definite, whereas not-beauty is always relative in that it
is differs from beauty. But speaking this way does not
imply that falsity does not exist, as a sophist might suggeS1. 21 The Sophist clarifies the relativity of the existence
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of not-being while affirming the existence of falsity in
speech and thought.
As an early representation of work in the philosophy of language, the Sophist investigates the use of attributes (both adjectives and participles) and their negations. It shows how their accepted use in language confuses the truth-value of statements with the subjective
relativity expressed by Protagoras' theory, homo mensutu.
If "man is the measure of all things," then man's relative
judgements exclude the possibility of an outside standard.
What is can only be spoken of in relation to another thing
that also is; that is, subject to judgement. To speak of "not
being" is to speak nonsense, for that which an individual
chooses to predicate of a thing is no more or less valid than
someone else's predication. As the characteristic of difference combined with other absolute forms, though, this
relativity is not the state of reality, but only a character of
certain propositions. Whereas before, differences could
only be spoken of from a subjective perspective in terms of
those things that are, the Sophist affirms how we can speak
of relativity without living in its darkness.
The sophist, in the end, is one concerned with "the art of
contradiction making, descended from an insincere kind of
conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image making, distinguished as a portion, not
divine, but human, of production, that presents a shadow
play of words... " 22 If one were to follow this bifurcation in
an attempt to describe how the philosopher's art is wholly
different from that of the sophists, we might say the philosopher is concerned with the art of discernment, descended from a sincere kind of knowledge by acquaintance,
derived from the making of originals, distinguished as a
portion, not human, but divine, of production, that presents
genuine discourse. This conclusion could have easily been
inferred by discernment through bifurcation. What the
Sophist clarifies is the nature of not-being and its relative
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existence. Just as to speak of not-being was, for some, to
speak nonsense, to speak of absolute relativity for Plato is
likewise to speak nonsense. The philosopher, then, is also
hard to find, but he hides not in the darkness of relative
obscurity. He dwells instead in the clear light where
difference is not confused with nonexistence.

Sophist, 254a-b. Unless otherwi se indicated, citations
from the Sophist are the P.M. Cornford translation in
Hamilton and Cairns, ed.
2 Sophis; 216a4
111
J Taylor, A.E. Pluto: the Man and His Work. 7 ed.
London: Methuen, 1960, pg. 374
4 Similarly, in the Symposium, there are practical reasons
why it is best that Diotima, rather than Socrates, serves as a
mouthpiece. See David Halperin, "Why Diotima is a
Woman," One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: And Other
Essnys of Greek Love, NY: Routledge Press , 1990
1

5 Most notably Meno 91-94, Apology 20a, and Cratylus
429d
6 Sophi st, 231 e4
7 ibid.
8 Italics mine , Sophist, 230d5-23I a2. Because Cornford
omits the long passage from 218d-230e, the first lines of
both the stranger and Theatetus are from the Jowett transla tion
y Taylor, pg. 380-1, on Sophist 231a 3
10 Campbell's interpretation mentioned as a footnote to
Taylor's argument on pgs. 380-1. According to Taylor,
Campbell's interpretation is grammatically impossible. 1
fail to see how this is so, given that the nuro«; of 231a 3
(Mn IlESOV uotou; 1tpocra1t'tOOIlEV "fEpa<;) clearly refers to
the ao<j>ta'ta<; of 231a I (cro<j>tata<;, though first declension,
is masculine). (editors note: I held a tough time including
the greek letters, and I know 1 do not helve all the accents in
the right place. If there is ,I misspelling, it is probably my
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fault, and not the suthots.)
Sophist, 230d. This art outl ined by the sophist is clearly
modeled after those of Socratic elenctics (see Meno 80a-d)
and midwifery (see Tbeuetetus 150b-151 d).
12 The skill of discernment is noted both as involved in
purification at 226d and as being part of the mastery of
dialectic at 253d
13 Sophist 253b
14 Sophist 253d
IS Sophist 233b
16 Meno 91 a-b
17 Naum, Milton, Selections from Early Greek Philosophy.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964, pg. 215
18 Sophist 260c
19 Sophist 257e 3
20 see Greater Hippies 289a-e
21 Sophist 260d
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Necessary Truth and the Existence of Physical
Objects
Nathan Jun

Loyola University Chicago
I. Introduction
Since at least the time of Descartes, one of the most
important issues facing Western philosophers has been the
relationship between the internal world of individual
human consciousness and the external world of physical
objects. Some thinkers, most notably Berkeley and Hegel,
sought to resolve the issue by altogether denying the
exist ence of an objective world beyond sense perception.'
Others, such as WV Quine, have gone to the opposite
extreme by denying the existence of consciousness, mental
substances, or anything else which could be said to exist
apart from the physical world.' All of these views share in
common the idea that some kind of polarity allegedly exists
between the external and the internal, such that one is
inexorably occasioned by, or derived from, the other.
I have argued elsewhere that an examination of the
axioms of formal logic, rather than of the nature or structure of consciousness, may provide a clue as to the ontological status of physical objects.' In what follows, I hope
to draw upon and improve this idea in an effort to prov ide a
deductive proof for the existence of physical objects apart
from cognition . In so doing, my chief goal is to establish a
prime facie distinction between the existence of physical
objects and the cognitive realization of those objects as
such . I shall not attempt to deal with broader issues pert aining to the ontological status of con sciousness, cognition ,
and the like .

II. Strong Idealism Defined
Unlike their ancient and medieval forebears , the philosophers of the Enlightenment were especially fascinated
by the vagaries of sense perception. By shifting the focus
of philosophy from reason to perceived experience, Locke,
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Berkeley, Hume, and their ilk radically challenged the
longstanding Aristotelian correspondence theory of knowledge and its accompanying metaphysical doctrines. More
important, they called into question the very intelligibility
of a "real world" which can be said to exist independently
. of knowing, experiencing subjects. In an orderly, piecemeal
succession, the empiricists divested epistemology of its old
tokens , starting with Locke's doubting of substantial
qualities and ending with Hume's rejection of substance
and mind.
Although Hume is not an idealist in the strict sense, he
nonetheless provides a very good example of the kind of
thinking I wish to criticize in this paper. Hume begins his
Treatise of Human Nature with a detailed consideration of
the origin of ideas. All perceptions, he says, can be divided
into ideas and impressions. The latter are those perceptions
which "enter with most force and violence," including
physical sensations, desires, emotions, et cetera." The
former, in contrast, are "faint images" of impressions
which emerge in the course of thinking and discourse.
According to Hume, all thoughts and ideas ultimately come
from impressions. We could not have idea') for things for
which we have no impressions whatsoever.'
All ideas of the mind seem to be interconnected by
some universal set of principles." The first of these , which
Hume terms resemblance, refers to the way in which
particular ideas or impressions are said to be similar to
other ideas or impressions. The second, contiguity, refers to
the way in which particular ideas or impressions are ordered in time and space. The third, cause and effect, refers
to the way in which certain ideas or impressions cause or
bring about other ideas or impressions.The first two principles pertain to relations between ideas and can be divided
into qualities such as identity, quality, et cetera.' Cause and
effect, in contrast, pertains to all contingent matters of fact
about the world."
Cause and effect , again , refers to relationships in which
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particular ideas or impressions seem to cause or occasion
other ideas or impressions. Hume argues that empirical
observation, rather than <I priori reasoning, leads us to posit
cause and effect: "Tho'the mind in its reasonings from
causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects,
which it sees or remembers, it must never lose sight of
them entirely, nor reason merely upon its own ideas ..."9
The observation of causal relationships between impressions forms the basis of human experience as well as all
reasoning about matters of fact. 10
Given that resemblance, contiguity, and causation are
the only ties that unite our ideas together in consciousness,
how are we to discern between true beliefs about matters of
fact and fictitious beliefs? In the first place, Hume says, a
belief is not the same thing as a simple idea. Rather, belief
is "a particular manner of forming an idea"! which convinces the mind of some one thing's existence. The idea,
moreover, is always formed according to relational and/or
causal relationships between present impressions or impressions given to us in the past." To put it another way,
the mind forms beliefs according to the resemblance,
contiguity, or causal connections which subsist among
particular impressions and ideas . In cases of demonstration,
truth is established precisely because falsity is unintelligible. But in cases of matters of fact, true belief is established to the extent that such a belief corresponds to present
impressions, impressions given in the past, or an agglomeration of both. Thus for Hume, all human knowledge
reduces to ideas; we can have no knowledge of substance.
This account of knowledge differs from that of Locke
and Berkeley in a number of important ways, a few of
which are certainly worth noting. For Locke, the mind can
only form simple idea'> from the primary substantial qualities of objects of experience (e.g., extension, numbers, the
power to produce secondary qualities in minds, etc)."
Locke takes for granted that minds exist and that these
minds form ideas from the primary qualities of objects of
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experience. It follows, then, that we can know something of
the substance - that is, the world outside our minds - but
only through its power to produce ideas within us. For
Berkeley, in contrast, we cannot even know the primary
qualities of substances." All we know are the ideas given
to the mind. It is impossible to know whether these ideas
correspond to some substance separate from our own
minds. Hume goes one step further then both Locke and
Berkeley by suggesting that all knowledge reduces to ideas
formed from impressions. We cannot even assume a
"mind" to which ideas are given, for the idea of mind is not
formed from present or past impressions.
For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to the aforementioned notion that all knowledge of existing things
reduces to ideas as strong idealism. Some philosophers,
including Kant, have attempted to refute strong idealism by
suggesting that an external world must exist in order for
our ideas to exist, even if the exact nature of this world
remains eternally beyond our grasp. IS More recently,
certain analytic philosophers have gone in the opposite
direction by suggesting that ideas, and all attendant notions
of mind, consciousness, and the like, are somehow reducible to physical or materialistic processes, thereby inverting
the nature of the problem entirely. For such philosophers,
the question is how to account for the existence of the
"internal world," and not vice versa. I make no attempt here
to deal with either of these solutions. Rather, I want to
suggest an alternate way to account for the existence of an
external world beyond cognition or sense experience by
examining the idea of logically necessary truth.
III. Necessary Truth and the Existence of Physical
Objects
All relevant epistemological issues aside, it is generally
accepted that certain truths of formal logic or mathematics,
such as "2+2=4," are necessary, such that their denial
implies a kind of unintelligible contradiction. To put it
another way, we cannot intelligibly imagine a state of
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affairs in which a necessary statement such as "2+2=4"
could be false, provided that the terms in question are
adequately defined. At the same time, however, we can
intelligibly imagine a universe which is like ours in all
respects except that it does not contain any human (or, for
that matter, rational) beings. The question then becomes:
do logically necessary truths obtain in such a universe?
In one sense, this seems impossible, inasmuch as it is
impossible to imagine any possible world in which the
denial of "2+2=4" is true. But it is also clear that the very
concepts (quantitative and otherwise) that are presupposed
by this statement are unintelligible in the absence of rational minds to conceive them. This latter point has led some
philosophers to conclude that the whole notion of necessary
truth is in some sense absurd. J.S. Mill, for instance, argues
that the "character of necessity ascribed to truths of mathematics , and even... the peculiar certainty attributed to
them, is an illusion [because] those truths relate to, and
express the properties of, purely imaginary objects.":"
Similarly, AJ . AyeI' points out that the reason necessary
truths are necessary is that "we cannot abandon them
without sinning against the rules which govern the use of
language, and so make our utterances self-stultifying."!'
But language is, of course, something which is inconceivable without the existence of beings who use language. In
this sense, logically necessary truths are only necessary
within a decidedly contingent context - namely, a context in
which rational beings exist.
Assuming that the latter point is true, i.e., that the
existence of rational beings is contingent, it follows that the
existence of any rational being X at time T is purely potential - that is, it mayor may not be the case that X exists at
time T. Assuming further that the aforementioned truths of
logic are ontologically dependent on the existence of some
rational being X, it follows that these truths mayor may
not obtain at time T, depending on whether X happens to
exist at T. From these assumptions, it would seem follow
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that in a universesuch that X does not exist at time T, none
of the logically necessary truths obtain at time T.
Even if we grant that the instantiation of logically
necessary truths is ontologically dependent on the existence
of some rational being X, it does not necessarily follow that
there is a possible rational being X such that the existence
of X could instantiate a different or even contradictory set
of logically necessary truths. In fact, it seems impossible to
imagine a rational being X such that the existence of X
instantiates a "truth" of the form "2+2=5." Even in a state
of pure potentiality, logically necessary truths seem binding
on all possible rational beings. To this extent, logically
necessary truths remain necessary for all possible beings,
whether or not such beings ever happen to actually exist at
all.
This idea implies, among other things, that the truth
value of certain logical axioms or propositions remains
independent of the actual cognition of some rational being
X. In other words, certain axioms or propositions remain
necessarily true even if the insuuuietion of these axioms or
propositions by some rational being X is contingent. If this
is the case, it follows that the truth value of logically
necessary axioms or propositions is in some sense independent of the ontological status of rational beings, possible or
actual. They remain constant even in a universe in which
rational beings happen not to exist.
Taken at face value, this view carries a number of
difficulties. It seems absurd, for example, to suggest that
"2+2=4" is a true proposition in a universe with no rational
beings to instantiate notions of quantity. Notice, however,
that the very construction of these arguments necessarily
implies that ouruniverse is such that at least one rational
being exists (namely, the author). And while it is certainly
true that the rational being in question just happens to exist
(that is, exists contingently), the fact remains that he does
actually exist, which means that the aforementioned logically necessary truths obtain.
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Let us assume for a moment that the external world , and
all physical objects that are part of the external world, do
not exist apart from the cognition of some rational being X
(a position which is roughly synonymous with 'strong
idealism'). Most of the aforementioned logically necessary
truths, especially those pertaining to mathematics, implic itly rely upon a principle of quantification, which in turn
relies upon principles of identity through which physical
objects are differentiated. If physical objects do not exist,
then it makes no sense to speak of "identities" and, by
extension, "quantities." Thus the very idea of a statement
such as "2+2=4" becomes, in some sense, unintelligible.
As we have already seen, however, it is impossible for
any possible rational being to come into existence and not
to instantiate the aforementioned logically necessary truths.
If this is the case, it follows that whenever some rational
being X comes into existence at time T, it not only instantiates certain logically necessary truths, but also all the
necessary preconditions involved with the instantiation of
these truths. Inasmuch as the actual existence of physical
obje cts is a precondition to the instantiation of at least some
of these truths (viz., the laws of mathematics), it follows
that the actual existence of some rational being X at time T
necessitates the existence of physical objects. And inasmuch as at least one rational being actually exists (viz., the
author), it follows that physical objects also exist.
It may be objected that the actual existence of physical
objects beyond the cognition of some rational being X is
not necessary for the instantiation of relevant logically
necessary truths. Quantity, for instance, may be derived
from 'ideas' of physical objects alone, whether or not these
ideas correspond to some reality outside of the cognition of
some rational being X. My reply is twofold. First, on what
basis can quantity be derived if ideas alone exist? On a
partially materialist view, quantity can be derived from
physical differences - that is, we can decide that there are
two things rather than one if the things in question meet
37
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certain physical criteria (e.g ., the atoms of which they are
constructed are at a certain spatio-temporal distance from
each other, the atoms have differing chemical make-ups,
etc). On what grounds can we possibly say of two ideas
that they are distinct without positing the existence of some
kind of super-ideal substance?
Second, the existence of ideas must come either from
some reality outside the cognition of some rational being
X, or else from other ideas already present to that same
being. If the latter is true, then the ideas in question must
themselves come from other ideas , or else they must come
from at least one innate idea. The former is not plausible
becau se it leads to an endless causal chain of ideas . The
latter, in contrast, needs to be accounted for according to a
principle of sufficient reason. Such an idea, even if innate,
must come from somewhere apart from itself. Clearly it
cannot come from another idea, since it is the first idea,
which means either it comes from an external world apart
from cognition or else was 'implanted' by some other
force.
The question then becomes what this 'other force' might
be. If it is not part of an external world outside of cogni tion, then it must be some kind of 'superphysical' or supernatural force. We then must decide whether the alleged
existence of such a 'supernatural force' carries more evidentiary weight than the alleged existence of an external,
physical world . The principle of parsimony (or Ockham's
razor, if you prefer) allows us to eliminate this hypothesis.
There is no need to posit the existence of a supernatural
force when we can just as easily account for the existence
of ideas with reference to an external world which exists
apart from the cognition of some rational being X.
The point is that quantity, among other things, logically
entails the existence of physical objects, such that quantity
cannot obtain apart from the existence of physical objects.
Even in a world in which some rational being X happens
not to exist, there is no state of affairs such that X could
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come into existence without the concomitant existence of
physical objects, for these are necessitated by the concomitant instantiation of logically necessary truths.

The preceding proof can be expressed in the following syllogistic form:
PI: If some rational being X exists at time T, then all
logically necessary truths are instantiated.
P2: The instantiation of some logically necessary truths is
ontologically dependent on the existence of physical
objects apart from the cognition of some rational being X.
P3: No physical objects exist apart from the cognition of
some rational being X.
P4: Some rational being X exists at time T.
C I: Therefore, only logically necessary truths that are not
ontologically dependent on the existence of physical
objects apart from the cognition of some rational being X
are instantiated at time T.
C2: But this is absurd (from PI and P2).
C3: Therefore, P3 is false.
C4: Therefore, some physical objects exist apart from the
cognition of some rational being X at time T.
In the foregoing proof, only a few of the premises are
truly controversial. P I seems irreproachable because its
negation would entail the denial of at least some logically
necessary truths, which is impossible . P2, however, depends on the aforementioned idea that certain logically
necessary truths, such as the laws of mathematics, require
the existence of physical objects to be intelligible. I have
already addressed one possible objection to this premise;
are there any others? It seems that one could deny that
concepts such as quant ity are ontologically dependent upon
the existence of physical objects, but it is unclear exactly
how this would be. Quantity presupposes the existence of
two Xs, where X is a physical object of some kind or else
an idea derived from a physical object.
The only other option is to deny the existence of cogni-
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tion. in which case all physical objects exist apart from the
cognition of some agent X. This option takes us beyond the
purview of metaphysics and into the philosophy of mind; as
such I make no attempt to deal with it here. The proof is
not intended to demonstrate that all existence is reducible
to physical phenomena, but rather to refute the strong
idealist position by demonstrating that at least some things
exist apart from the cognition of some rational being X.
The question of whether cognition exists at all as a separate, non-physical phenomena is left open. I should point
out, however, that the general foundation of this proof, as
well as its conclusions, seem perfectly compatible with a
strong materialist view of mind and substance.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, although the instantiation of logically necessary
truths is ontologically dependent UP(;>n the existence of
some rational being X, their necessity is such that they
could not be otherwise for any possible rational being X.
This implies that the actual existence of any rational being
X at time T brings with it the instantiation of logically
necessary truths, as well as any and all preconditions which
this instantiation requires. I have argued that the actual
existence of physical objects is a precondition to the
instantiation of at least some of these truths. Whether or not
cognition stands in any real relationship to physical objects
remains an open question. But in the meantime, the existence of logically necessary laws provides sufficient
grounds for concluding that at least some physical objects
exist apart from the cognition of rational beings.
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I. cf. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of
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Online Psychotheraphy: A Case Study in
Technology and Values
Brenda Gummerson
San Jose State University
For centuries, human beings have looked to other
members of the community for guidance and advice in
personal matters. Psychotherapy as a profession, however,
has existed for a relatively short period in history, approximately seventy years. Over time, problems such as depression, anxiety, alcohol and drug abuse, and sexual dysfunction, among others, have been addressed by a number of
accepted methods of treatment, including psychoanalysis,
behavior therapy, person-centered therapy, and the newer
cognitive-behavioral treatments. What binds these various
forms of treatment together? According to Rosenhan and
Seligman:
Psychological therapy consists of a systematic series
of interactions between a trained therapist who has been
authorized by society to minister to psychological problems, and one or more clients who are troubled, or troubling others, because of such problems. The goal of psychological therapy is to produce cognitive, emotional, and
behavioral changes that will alleviate those problems.
(p.734)
Traditionally, psychotherapy by qualified professionals has been carried out face-to-face in the privacy of the
therapy room, or alternatively, in the context of a support
group that brings clients with closely related problems
together for joint therapy. Occasionally, a therapy session
might be conducted over the telephone under extenuating
circumstances. With the development of the Internet, a
new modality for therapy has emerged: the online psychotherapy session.
As with many other services, the number of websites
related to mental health has expanded rapidly over the past
several years. In 1997,Metanoia, a website sponsored by
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Martha Ainsworth, who describes herself as a con-.
sumer advocate for mental health, listed 50 providers of
mental health services on the web (GrohoJ, 1997). Three
years later, these number more than 160 (Ainsworth, 1999).
Services are provided through video-conferencing, on
specially designed web pages, in the context of a chat
room, or most commonly, via email (Ainsworth, 1999).
The appeal of the Internet in psychotherapy seems obvious-the convenience, the perception of privacy, the possibility of anonymity. However, a careful examination is
required to determine whether or not online psychotherapy
is a legitimate and ethical method of delivering mental
health care.
As with traditional psychotherapy, the qualifications
of the therapist, issues of confidentiality, and the effectiveness of the treatment remain paramount. Specifically, is
the therapist qualified and licensed to provide mental health
services? Is private information shielded from undesired
scrutiny? Does the client have a reasonable expectation
that therapy will result in amelioration of psychological
problems? In the case of online mental health services, it
can be shown that these criteria are not adequately met.
Qualific;ltion.'l of the Therapist
How does a consumer of mental health services know
whether they have hired a qualified therapist who adheres
to ethical standards? Developmentof the profession of
psychotherapy has entailed the establishment of standards
of training and competence, as well as a formal code of
ethics. Currently in the United States, licensing of psychotherapists and adherence to professional and ethical codes
is regulated at the state level. For example, in California,
the Board of Behavioral Sciences (a division of the California Department of Consumer Affairs) is responsible for
overseeing the professional conduct of Marriage and
Family Therapists and Licensed Clinical Social Workers.
The activities of psychiatrists and licensed clinical psychologists are controlled by similar agencies. A therapist
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who does not comply with professional and ethical standards is subject to disciplinary action by the licensing
board, which has the power to revoke the therapist's license. The incompetent or unethical therapist may also
face proceedings in the criminal and civil courts.
Online delivery of mental health services raises new
concerns. Regulation of the Internet, which is closely
related to telecommunications and potentially involves
interstate commerce, falls under the auspices of the Federal
Communications Commission. However, this agency has
no jurisdiction over the conduct of psychotherapists.
Moreover, laws that address the licensing and conduct of
psychotherapists vary from state to state. A resident of one
state who seeks online treatment from a therapist in another
state may not be adequately protected under the laws of
either state.
Presently, consumers who seek psychological advice
online are largely at the mercy of the provider, who mayor
may not conform to the ethical and professional standards
of the state in which the client resides. John Grohol
(1997), an early provider of online mental health services,
raises the question, if online clients encounter an incompetent or unethical therapist, to whom will they turn for
redress? It is entirely possible that a person may retain the
services of an online therapist who does not reside in the
same country, let alone the same state, as that person.
Local laws may not apply to the therapist who resides
elsewhere, and even if they do, how will the therapist be
held accountable from a distance? Some states are in the
process of developing legislation that addresses issues of
long distance supervision of care and eligibility for reimbursement for medical services provided electronically via
"telemedicine" (Telernedicine Information Exchange,
2000). Still, it remains unclear how compliance to such
laws will be enforced, even if they are interpreted to include mental health services. Given the lack of regulation
in contracting for online mental health services, it is the
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case of "buyer beware."
Priwlcyon the Internet
Some argue that online therapy offers a degree of
privacy and anonymity that traditional psychotherapy
cannot offer. It is important here to make a distinction
between privacy and anonymity. Privacy involves restricting access to one's personal information. Anonymity, on
other hand, involves keeping one's identity secret. A
person may remain anonymous and disclose very personal
or private information, but any privacy achieved in this way
hinges on protection of that person's identity. When
advantages of online psychotherapy are presented, "privacy" is often mentioned, but advocates of web-based
treatment may be confusing anonymity with privacy.
Although it may be possible to achieve a degree of anonymity online, the privacy of communications transmitted
over the Internet is inherently at risk. This presents a
dilemma for those who provide mental health services
online.
Confidentiality, a strict code of protecting anonymity
and privacy for clients, is a fundamental ethical principle
for psychotherapists. Confidential information can be
revealed only in very specified circumstances, for example,
if a client poses a real danger to self 01' others, 01' if a client
discloses knowledge of child abuse. In either case the
therapist is obliged ethically and legally to report this
knowledge to the authorities. In the case of online therapy,
confidentiality is removed from the control of the therapist
who is responsible for it. There is a distinct possibility that
electronic communications may be interceptedeither
intentionally or inadvertently. A person might send an
email to a therapist using a computer at work, not realizing
that electronic communications in the workplace are monitored and not currently protected by privacy laws. In
another case, a client may send an email to the therapist,
realizing after the "send" button is clicked that the email
has been accidentally sent to the wrong person and cannot
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be retrieved. If communications are sent via satellite,
the signal may be detected and de-scrambled by equipment
that is easily obtained via the Internet. In the wrong hands,
privateemails and "chats" could be quickly and widely
distributed via the Worldwide Web. Even in the privacy of
one's own horne, there is always the chance that another
person can walk into the room and become party to very
private thoughts and feelings that are not intended to be
shared. Clearly, though there is a perception of privacy on
the Internet, there are considerable risks when one trusts
. deeply personal information to electronic transmission, and
the online therapist cannot guarantee confidentiality.
Could privacy be protected by adopting a pseudonym
in order to achieve anonymity? As pointed out above,
privacy attained through anonymity depends predominantly
on protection of the person's identity. If the alternate
identity can be linked in any way to a real person, any
. privacy gained through anonymity is lost. Payment to
online psychotherapists or their agents may be tracked
through credit card records, and with some effort, screen
names can often be associated with a particular computer
or a specific account with an Internet service provider. The
success of government agents in identifying hackers and
ferreting out the sources of malicious viruses clearly
demonstrates the impossibilityof remaining entirely anonymous on the Web.
Even if complete privacy and anonymity were feasible
on the Internet, does provision of psychotherapy to anonymous clients serve their best interests and protect individuals at risk of harm? When the oath of confidentiality must
be ethically and legally violated, how is the therapist to
identify and help authorities locate the person in harm's
way, if that person's identity and location is unknown?
Although it is possible for the traditional psychotherapy
client to remain anonymous by giving a fictitious name and
paying in cash, in practice this rarely happens, and therapists usually have the information to take swift and
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diatc action when necessary (Grohol, 1998). Moreover, if a client is carefully maintaining anonymity by
concealing personal information, it seems likely that there
will also be a failure to disclose details that might be
pertinent to therapy, such as the person's place of residence, age, marital status, and occupation. These factors
may be critical in establishing the nature of a person's
problems and identifying possible solutions. Perhaps more
important, the psychotherapeutic relationship is founded on
a high degree of trust between therapist and client. Attempting to build trust while keeping one's identity a secret
seems contradictory, and in the context of psychotherapy, it
is even more illogical. In summary, then, provision of
mental health services online removes control over privacy
from the therapist, may restrict the ability of the therapist
to intercede in those cases which require an ethical breach
of confidentiality, and may in fact interfere with effective
treatment by inadvertently encouraging the tendency to
avoid disclosure.
Effectivenessof Treatment
Assuming the qualifications of the therapist are established, and that privacy can be controlled and maintained
within acceptable bounds, can the online psychotherapist
achieve the effectiveness of face-to-face psychotherapy?
Many studies have established the importance of the therapist expressing empathy, warmth, and genuineness. With
this approach, the therapist fosters an atmosphere in which
a strong therapeutic alliance can be established with the
client. This collaborative relationship provides for joint
decisions about goals and treatment and has been found to
be a significant factor in the improvement of mental health
through psychotherapy (Rosenhan & Seligman, 1995).
How might the characteristics of online communication
affect the therapeutic alliance? In their study of online
support groups, Miller and Gergen (1998) state, "The
[online] community is virtual because it does not exist in a
single geographic locale, does not involve face-to-face
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immeinterchange, and is often constituted by communication that does not take place in real time (but rather
through messages posted at one time and answered at
another)"(p.190). These features of Internet communication may negatively affect the therapeutic alliance and
interfere with the attainment of behavioral change. King
and Moreggi (1998) note that a therapist who is geographically remote from a client is likely to remain unaware of
local customs, potentially resulting in a misunderstanding
.between the therapist and client. They also point out that
social and environmental conditions (for example, the
prevailing work ethic, economic instability, a recent rise in
crime, or a prolonged heat wave) are factors that might
affect the emotional state of the client, unbeknownst to the
therapist.
Additionally, it seems reasonable that a relationship
initially established online is less likely to be maintained
over time. Ordinary long distance relationships, even those
developed more traditionally and maintained through
electronic and written correspondence, wane to some
degree in the absence of physical proximity. Despite the
best of intentions, not having met face-to-face, the online
client and therapist who are geographically distant seem
predisposed to fewer interactions, predicting a weaker
therapeutic alliance.
Currently, most psychological advice provided online
is dispensed via email. The lack of face-to-face interaction
requires the therapist and client to communicate in a way
that is strictly text-based, such that warmth and empathy
must be expressed by the therapist to the client in written
form. As any writer of fiction can attest, it is difficult to
convey the depth and complexity of emotion in textual
form without sounding either trite or overdramatic. However, when engaged in face-to-face psychotherapy, the
therapist can communicate genuine concern and interest
through an effective melding of words, vocal tone, and
facial expression. Likewise, the therapist can assess
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whether discrepancies ex ist between the client's words and
facial expressions, and explore the nature of such
inconsistencies in the course of therapy.
The lack of real-time communication poses an additional drawback to offering psychological advice by.email.
Hours or days may pass between the client's written communication and the therapist's response to a particular
statement or concern. In contrast, the face-to-face therapist
can respond immediately to a client during the session,
focusing on problem behaviors in a more timely manner.
In summary, geographic distance, text-based communications, and delayed responses present significant challenges to mental health profe ssionals on the Internet.
Overall, when online provision of mental health services is
compared to traditional psychotherapy, it appears to be less
conducive to establishing an,effective therapeutic relationship. In the absence of a strong alliance between the client
and therapist, behavioral change is less likely to occur.
Addressing the Problems
National certification of online therapists has been
proposed as a possible solution to the lack of regulation of
online psychotherapy. Still, it will take an alliance between
national professional associations, state licensing agencies,
and the Federal Communications Commission to come up
with a workable system that can provide some assurance to
those who seek mental health care online. Given the slow
rate at which bureaucratic changes are made, it seems
likely that the provision of mental health services online
will continue to grow unchecked.
Advocates of online psychotherapy will argue that
increased security on the Internet through sophisticated
encryption will solve the problem of diminished privacy on
the Internet. However, the information is still vulnerable to
those persons who have access to the enc ryption decoding
programs, such as administrators of chat rooms, email
services, and web pages. And although some clients may
be more comfortable disclosing relevant personal informa-
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tion when anonymous, others who seek therapy online may
continue to conceal pertinent information in an ongoing attempt to maximize privacy and minimize embarrassment. In the latter case, online psychotherapy is of no
advantage in facilitating disclosure and achieving understanding of the client's problems.
Online video-conferencing may provide a solution to
the limitations of textual communications in establishing
the therapeutic alliance. Facial expression and vocal tone
are added to the verbal communication, provided the
electronic transmission is of sufficient quality. Still, the
issues of geographic distance, including cultural differences
and the difficulty in establishing a personal relationship
with someone never met, remain unsolved. Perhaps most
important, in evaluating a client face-to-face, a more
complete mental health and physical examination can be
carried out (King & Moreggi, 1998). This comprehensive
assessment is necessary to make an accurate diagnosis and
develop an effective treatment plan. For example, through
direct observation the therapist can evaluate whether the
client is appropriately groomed, and whether there are any
signs of substance abuse, such as alcohol on the breath or
track marks on veins. Internet communication, even with
high quality video conferencing, does not always achieve
the necessarydegree of visual resolution, let alone transmit
olfactory information . Even if the psychotherapist can
establish a positive alliance with a client over the Internet,
the limitations of online psychotherapy can compromise
diagnosis and treatment.
Conclusions
Online provision of general information regarding
mental health may be helpful, but the lack of coordinated
regulation, the potential for violation of confidentiality, and
the difficulty in arriving at a diagnosis and attaining an
effective therapeutic alliance, support the argument that
personalized online mental health services are incompatible
with the ethical practice of psychotherapy. The goal of
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psychotherapy is to alleviate psychological problems, and
many of these problems involve interpersonal relationships. Interestingly, Miller and Gergen (1998) note, "As
the number of dependable and available partners for intimate conversation has diminished, troubled persons turn
increasingly to therapists. 'Talking cures' operate, then, as
important surrogates for significant others in daily
life"(p.190). Easy access to online psychological services
may drive even more people toward psychotherapy in the
absence of conventional supports such as friends, relatives,
and intimate partners. Researchers, clinicians, and even
some savvy consumers of mental health care, already
wonder to what extent improvement achieved in traditional
therapy generalizes to other relationships. Online psychotherapy is carried out in an environment that bears even less
resemblance to everyday life than established modes of
therapy. Therefore, in analyzing aspects of online psychotherapy, another very important question must be asked.
Given its differences from ordinary life, will online psychotherapy induce positive changes in interpersonal skills
that transfer to relationships outside of therapy? Or alternatively, will the client simply become more adept at online
communication with a paid supporter? If the latter is the
case, then web-based psychotherapy, despite its potential
advantages and good intentions, will ultimately fail to bring
about a better life for its subscribers.
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Religion of Humanity as Public Religion: An
Alternate Reading of J.S. Mill's Utility of
Religion
John Daniel Ward
University of the Pacific
Published posthumously, Mill's Three Essnys on
Religion includes an often overlooked essay of great import, The Utility of Religion. In this brief piece, Mill
examines whether there are reasons to maintain traditional
religious beliefs (supernaturalism) in the context of the
implausibility of its doctrines. He does not side with
Clifford in that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for
everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence",
granting that if traditional religion has positive utility, it
should be retained in the face of its intellectual problems
(Quoted in James 721). Mill's thesis, however, is that
contemporary society should abandon traditional religious
beliefs in favor of the naturalized 'religion of humanity' (a
term borrowed from Comte). While I agree that the religion of humanity would have far more positive utility than
vulgar Christianity,comments made by Mill in other works
suggest that the religion of humanity should not be understood as an exclusive religious system, but rather as a
framework within which examined religious beliefs may be
maintained.
Mill does not dispute the special role religion has
typically played in the context of the social good. Most
people are quick to cite traditional religious reasons for
their moral beliefs, and turn their hopes upward when in
crisis. He points out, however, that "[e]arly religious
teaching has owed to its power over mankind rather to its
being early than its being religious" (210). Through
authority, early education, and public opinion, religion is
able to achieve its special status as an instrument of the
social good. A special significance is placed on religious
authority from childhood, and is strongly reinforced by
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public opinion for the rest of one's life (Matz 3). These
attributes are not exclusively religious, and thus may be
used in the service of other systems of belief (i.e. religion
of humanity).
Mill also agrees that traditional religion has historically played an important role in the context of personal
perfection. Religion has traditionally been a supplement to
political laws, "a more cunning sort of police", a personal
corrective instrument which makes individualsexamine
.their motives in a manner that political laws could never
achieve (4 15). This role has been historical and accidental,
and traditional religion does not have an exclusive claim to
the power of this 'cunning police' force. With the weight
of the three 'natural' conditions laid out above, it becomes
apparent that other systems can be inculcated such that
their doctrines have the same force. The question then
. becomes which type of belief system has more public and
personal utility? Mill clearly thinks that a religion of
humanity is the better choice.
Mill points out that "[t]he essence of religion is the
strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires
towards an ideal object, recognized as the highest excellence, and as rightfully paramount over all selfish objects
of desire" (422). The religion of humanity replaces a
perfect metaphysical being with the community of humanity (understood broadly to include the past, present, and
future). The 'highest excellence' which should be the focus
of our public religious observances is "[t]he idealization of
our earthly life, the cultivation of a high conception of what
it may be made" (420). Instead of focusing on a personal,
atomistic, effort to become what one can never be (a
perfect metaphysical being), we should focus on making
the community of humanity the best that it can be. In
doing so, we should look to people of great importance in
the past for inspiration, and they should be the focus of
public honors. Much in the line of Bentham, who points
out the value of 'pleasures of piety', seeing oneself as
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being in the favor of one of these past persons of import
will bring one a great deal of comfort, in much the same
way that the traditional religious person is comforted by the
idea that they are in God's favor. Understanding the world
in this way will result in systems of ethics which take into
account our fundamental connectedness and foster personal
virtues (or a more 'cunning police' force) that will also
recognize the importance of our obligations to each other.
Traditional Christian ethics stand in stark contrast to
this novel system. In On Liberty, Mill points out that what
is termed Christian ethics is actually a theological construct
of the Middle Ages (Augustine and Aquinas). He argues
that the "Gospel always refers to a pre-existing morality
ami confines its precepts to the particulars in which that
morality was to be corrected." The moral teachings in the
Bible have the poetic quality of generality, not the precision
of legislation. As an ethical system intended to respond to
the prevalenceof paganism, Christian moral teachings are
largely negative. Mill points out that, "in its
precepts...'thou shall not' predominates unduly over 'thou
shalt'", The stoic asceticism of early Christianity has been
slowly turned into a form of legalism, leading its adherents
to a selfish conception of moral obligation, obscuring the
intimate connections to each other expressed in other moral
systems. The ideas of positive Obligation to humanity
which are present, have their basis in classical, rather than
Christian, sources. Mill continues by arguing that the
moral teachings of Christ are not intended to stand alone,
but should rather be incorporated into a substantive and
positivemoral system (utilitarianism in Mill's case) (On
Liberty 47-48).

Mill then points out that the hope of an afterlife is
apparently the one advantageenjoyed by traditional, over
naturalized. religion. Citing the contemporary example of
Buddhism, and the historical case of the Ancient Greeks, he
shows that well developed moral persons can function
without the belief in an afterlife. He also says that this
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hope is not necessarily desirable, asa future set of circumstances can be imagined in which immortality would seem
to be a burdensomeidea, rather than a gift. Taking this
idea in the light of Feuerbach's doctrine of projection,
Mill's point becomes far more clear. If the function of
religion is to project what we see as important about humanity onto some metaphysical 'other', then modern
science may one day lead us to value mortality and finitude
over immortality. Perhaps when medical science advances
to the point at which our livescan be extended to lengths
currently unimaginable, the willingness of Jesus to end His
life will be seen as a doctrine more 'divine' than His resurrection. As we make ourselves increasingly 'immortal' ,
resources will become limited, and the sacrifice of death
will become a necessary moral obligation. In that context,
one can see the value in Mill's position. Death itself could
then be seen as having positive utility and be considered a
moral good. while life beyond death would seem to be a
strange remnant from some past age (as science had practically achieved the feat).
In Theism, however, Mill admits the positive utility
of the hope of an afterlife. This essay was written a decade
after The Utility of Religion and must be seen as a correction of his previous position. Understood as other regarding, a hope in an afterlife, to allow individuals to reap what
they deserved in this life (following Kant's postulate of the
immortal soul), can achieve its practical ends, while avoiding the problem of selfishness created by traditional Christianity. While our ability to be altruistic is harmed when
hoping that God will deliver us from our troubles in some
future state of affairs, it is enhanced when hoping that the
work towards perfection made by some other person killed
prematurely had not gone to waste. Understood as such,
the hope for an afterlife allowed by traditional religion can
be more advantageous (in terms of utility) than the exclusive hope for species improvement allowed for in the
religion of humanity (Matz).
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This correction is not problematic if Mill is understood to be creating a 'public religion', or general system
of shared beliefs in which persons of diverse faiths retain
non-conflicting doctrines. The central tenet of the religion
of humanity, the "idealization of our earthly life, the cultivation of a high conception of what it may be made", is
compatible with some form of most, if not all, traditional
religious beliefs (420). Within the shared system of beliefs,
therefore, there is ample room for freedom of religion.
Expressed in this way, Mill's position is modified in a
manner which makes the religion of humanity quite similar
to the 'public religion' concept expressed by Robert Bellah
and others in Habits of the Heett. While the authors of
Habits of the Heart express the need for such a general
framework , they are hesitant to layout its content. With
his doctrine of the religion of humanity, Mill has provided
content while not explicitly expressing the project.
While the general or public religion (religion of
humanity) can be seen as having the most positive utility, it
can still be objected that each belief system within its
boundaries is open to the same objections Mill raises
against traditional religion. However, in order to remain
consistent with the central tenets of the public religion,
certain dogmas of the many faiths need modification.
Immortality needs to be understood in the manner laid out
above (as other regarding). While Mill's system leaves
open the possibility of the existence of God (as he is in the
empiricist tradition, and there is no empirical evidence
strong enough to disprove the possibility of God's existence), it does seem to preclude the understanding of God as
perfect, and Mill explicitly abandons omnipotence in
Theism. The notion of the perfect God leads to the problem of evil, and therefore needs to be replaced with a God
who is in some respects involved in a current co-creation of
the world with the community of humanity. This is the
position of Whitehead and other process philosophers.
While God can be seen as the greatest of all possible
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entities, it would be inconsistent with the public religion to
hold God to be perfect in the metaphysical sense. Modifications of a similar sort would need to be made to nonChristian belief systems in order to incorporate them within
the general framework. Modified as such, these systems of
belief would escape the criticisms Mill levied at traditional
religion.
Nobody would be forced to adopt a belief system
which fits within the wider public religion, of course, as
this would be a clear violation of Mill's 'liberty principle'.
The power of the three natural conditions can be used to
reinforce the public religion, however, and people brought
up within that framework will be more likely to adopt
systems of belief compatible with the public standard. The
public religion will always be open for reinterpretation as
our understanding of what is best in humanity evolves. To
borrow an idea from Feuerbach, we will 'project' what we
see as important into a new form of the public religion.
That shared belief system will then help determine how we
see ourselves. By focusing solely on what is best in and for
us, this public religion is able to escape the devaluation of
humanity Feuerbach points out as present in traditional
theism. As science and philosophy work together to advance our understandingof what it means to be humane,
the public religion will be open to modification .
If Mill is read as promoting the religion of humanity to the exclusion of other systems of belief, there is
ample room for objection. As Mill himself points out,
there is some positive utility gained in an other regarding
hope for an afterlife. This is not present in the religion of
humanity seen as an exclusive system. In addition, understood in this narrow sense the religion of humanity would
fail to meet one of the needs met by religion, it would not
help to explain why the world is as it is. Religion reaches
beyond science and posits answers to the metaphysical
questions we are driven to ask. Science answers the what,
and sometimes the how, but it is religion that supplies us
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with the answer to why. While the religion of humanity
understood exclusively would be a great moral system, it
would not be a complete 'religion ' .
Mill's discussion of religion as a principle of social
unity in On Liberty points out another problem caused by
this narrow reading of the religion of humanity. He explains that Marcus Aurelius, the great Roman emperor and
stoic philosopher. expresses in his Meditmions a great sense
of moral duty which is actually quite similar to that of
traditional Christianity. Uncomfortable with removing the
sense of unity brought to the Roman people by the Pantheon, Aurelius retained the traditional religious beliefs,
even persecuting Christianity, though the Emperor was "a
better Christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the
word.. .". Aurelius is used as an example of fallibility, and
Mill warns the Christian conservative, who "flatters himself
that he is a wiser and better man than MarcusAurelius",
not to make the same mistake in persecuting novel religious
theories (i.e. the religion of humanity). Conversely, the
same argument could be used to warn the dogmatic proponent of the religion of humanity against exclusionary
persecution. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Mill intended
the religion of humanity to be taken as an exclusive religious system.
It appears that he would be far more comfortable
understanding it as a public religion, or framework within
which other traditional beliefs are retained. If adopted as
such, Mill's system would do what Aurelius did not apparently consider a possibility; the public religion would retain
the Pantheon and improve morality using stoicism (understood as corresponding to utilitarianism in Mill's system).
Religious freedom would be maintained and positive
personal and social utility would be enhanced. Therefore,
the best reading of Mill's religion of humanity is to understand it as a general framework (public religion) within
which people of faith retain non-conflicting religious
dogma, thus gaining the benefits of naturalized religion,
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while retaining traditional religion's promise of an afterlife
and answers to universal metaphysical questions.
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Duty of the Sovereign
Peter O'Sullivan

San Jose State University
Tonight trom tile Punishment Dome in WClshingloll,
D.C., it's Gorebot versus Dubya in Moral Combut. At
stake: the Presidency of the United Stetcs, end maybe even
the iute otdcmocrucy as we know it.

Anyone living and cogent during the 2000 presidential race can understand where that opening comes from.
To say anything, the race for the highest office in the land
was reduced to a farce played out on national television,
starring tweedle-dumb and tweedle-dumberwhile the
Walrus and the Carpenter snacked on their oysters. Unfortunately, elections in wonderland were the least of what this
race represented. More insidious than the media bias
toward Shrub, more powerful than a Moses-led gun lobby,
able to leap small countries in a single bound, this election
saw the rise of partial societies and their threat to the
sovereign. The United States of America has lost sight of
its wish to form a more perfect union and placed in its
stead the power plays of special interests and an uninterested population.
Of the Social Contract theoreticians, Rousseau
seems to be the most egalitarian and the most applicable to
today's political woes. Hobbes, when not leaping out from
the bushes, would see us subjugated to his leviathan,
controlled by a large authoritarian government. Also, while
we are definitely a Lockean society, property is not the
issue here - property is the least of our concerns. No, it
seems that Rousseau is the best angle because while propcity creates the need for society, the rights to life and
liberty outweigh the right to property two-to-one; right now
the country needs a dose of liberty to resuscitate life.
According to Rousseau, the sovereign is the People
as opposed to the lower-case people. This People is the
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same one mentioned in the preamble to the United States
constitution when it begins "We the People of the United
States, in Order to form a more perfect Union," and so on.
lt is this people, the sovereign, to whom states and princes
(or in our system, politicians) are answerable. It is the
people who are the power behind the state and it is the
general will that must be upheld.
This isn't to say that the general will is omnipotent.
The will is only as strong as the sovereign and when the
sovereign allows the passage of what Rousseau calls "gen.eral ills,'" does not oppose them, or even encourages them,
then I contend that the sovereign is degenerate. Rousseau
contends that such a degeneration is not of the general will
but of particular wills bolstered by partial societies within
the state. His solution is that these partial societies should
either be eradicated altogether, or made numerous and
equal so that no one group has dominance to affect the will.
The United States has seen the rise of two such
partial societies, neither of which is capable of being killed
with anything less than a political nuclear device. These
behemoth societies, whom I'll refer to as Elephants and
Donkeys, prove Rousseau's assertion that
"when there are factions, lesser associations detrimental to the greater one, the will of each of them becomes
general in relation to its members and particular in relation
to the state. It can then be said that there are no longer as
many voters as there are men but only as many as there are
associations,"?
According to the U.S. Census bureau, there were a
projected 205 million age-eligible voters on November 7,
2000:' Of those, slightly more than 100 million participated in the voting process. Of those 100 million there was
an almost unprecedented fifty-fifty split (actually 49-49,
but that would be splitting hairs at this point) between the
Donkeys and the Elephants in the presidential popular vote.
Taking into account various disqualifying factors such as
felony convictions and citizenship, approximately one
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quarter of age-eligible voters stood on one side or the other
of the political playground.
What then happens to the three-quarters of the
voting population who are not represented by the duly
elected official? It seems that when the general will degenerates due to the proliferation of partial societies, there can
no longer be said to be a viable general will. Then what?
Slavery I say. "A man who renounces his freedom renounces his humanity, along with the rights of humanity,
and even its duties." But what about a man or woman
who renounces his/her duties? Voting, which many call a
right, is really a duty commensurate with other duties like
jury and income tax . These are the membership responsibilities for one of the most popular clubs in the world.
Is voting a duty, or a right? Certainly there are no
legal consequences to not voting. Voting is not mandatory
for citizenship, nor is it compulsory under any law. There
are no cartoon thugs in polyester suits brandishing .45
automatics saying "vote or die." Part of the social contract
is the relinquishing of certain rights and freedoms that it is
"important for the community to control'", This is different from the abrogation of rights above because all rights
under the social contract are contingent upon the meeting
of certain obligations. While voting seems like a right,
smells like a right, tastes like a right, it really is a duty.
Unfortunately this is not a value shared by most people in
fact, half the voting population. Yet, consider that it.should
be a shared value, one that American citizens point to and
say "this makes me an American; I can grab a hold of my
and my country's destiny and try to shape it. I am part of a
larger whole that is the sovereign."
Rule by the majority is a consequence of the social
contract." By Rousseau's account the majority accounts
for the general will while the minority is in some way
mistaken. While this simplification makes democracy and
voting seem somewhat suspect, it also lays foundation for
the argument that voting is a duty. "The unequivocal will
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of all the members of the state is the general will"; that will
is expressed by what the majority have declared their will
to be. However, when the majority of the state remains
silent, refuses to offer an opinion, or let known their will,
then the minority becomes the majority - the counted
majority - and when the general will ceases to be known
through the majority "no matter what decision is made,
there is no longer any freedom."?
A slight anecdote, if I may: I once had a discussion
. about voting with a peer. He was a conservative young
man, self-identified as a devout Christian, and very conscientious about the world around him. Only, he did not vote.
When I asked him about it, he told me that after he registered to vote he started receivingjury summonses, (J
informed him that just having a driver's license puts you on
the jury lists; he didn't believe me) so he called the registrar of voters and had them de-register him.
That young man refused to be a part of the sovereign because of the inconvenience of jury duty. In that way
he subjugated his freedom to those who would make the
decisions for him. In essence, he became a slave. No one
owned him, could sell him, or lay claim to him personally,
but slavery, in its very nature is the abrogation of freedom
and with freedom comes both rights as well as responsibilities. Abrogate responsibility and you abrogate rights.
Abrogate rights and you abrogate freedom.
This young man, though he mayor may not have
subscribed to either of the major partial societies, subjugated himself to both of them since he refused his duty to
influence issues that would affect both him and society at
large. There are many reasons for not participating in the
vote: apathy, ignorance, or some wildy ineffectual form of
protest. These reasons, however, are simply excuses for /lot
participating, for throwing away the chance to make one's
voice heard, and for failing to reaffirm the freedom guaranteed by the written manifestation of the United States's
social contract known as the Constitution.
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The trend toward political slavery is in part due to
the pervading sense that an individual's vote does not
count, that in someway a vote is a waste of time, paper, and
energy. The political parties put up candidates that the
people feel don't represent them, who are going to be
elected anyway by the power that the party possesses. This
is what Rousseau meant when partial societies supported
less voters than men. Those whose convictions do not lie
with any partial society find themselves placed in a position
where political slavery seems to be the only option. This
political slavery is not always a conscious choice, though,
as it can be made through, as I said, apathy, ignorance, and
that strange form of protest that ['II now get into.
There is a belief that there is a way to protest the
choices in an election by simply not voting. This belief
seems to be linked to the existentialist notion of the choice
to not choose. While in theory this sounds like it should be
pretty standard practice (the equivalent to an abstention)
there is a problem. In a small board or council an abstention is as much an opinion as a vote either way. An abstention tells the people that the voter did not agree either way
and chose not to choose. Not voting in a general or presidential election in America, however, is not the same as
abstaining because it is not put on record. If the purpose of
not voting is protest then it fails. The purpose of protest is
to communicate a message. By not voting, the protestors
are lumped together with the ignorant and the apathetic,
thus losing their message. Besides, there is a reason for
write-in votes, isn't there?
There is also the proliferation of special interests
that tum people away from the system and the sovereign.
"Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private
interests on public affairs," and nothing is more influential
than a special interest lobby. Gun lobbies and Tobacco
lobbies are only two of the guilty parties. Their special
interest is a private interest which in the end is profits. Yes
there are constitutional issues with guns, but there is still a
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deep. financial, personal interest in keeping governmental
regulation of guns at a minimum. The same goes for the
Tobacco lobby which has a vested interest in keeping its
product unregulated and available.
Now that I have spent much time complaining about
the state of the state, what are the solutions? Unfortunately
there are no magical solutions for reinvigorating life into
the people and repairing the sovereign. Healing will be
slow and is only attainable though the strength of will. The
people will have to want to change. Without the will to
change there can be no healing of the general will.
People will have to understand that voting is a duty,
not a right, and that voting for what one believes in is the
only way to ensure that the general will is upheld, otherwise the minor-majority has it within their power to subvert
the general will and subjugate the sovereign. Even the notvoting-as-protest issue has some kind of place if done
properly. Things like "none of the above" initiatives, or
even submitting an unfilled ballot act as some kind of
abstention since there does appear to be a record of those.
Not showing up is just a product of apathy, ignorance, and I
have decided that laziness can be put on that list as well.
The partial societies of Elephants and Donkeys need
to have their wings clipped. Their powers are such that
their influence is far too great and sometimes even far to
polarized for them to represent the sovereign. They represent their own sovereigns, separate from the People, yet
existing under the guise of being political voices for the
People so they don't have to think. However, "if the
general will is to be clearly expressed, it is important that
there be no partial societies within the state, and that each
citizen form his opinion independently." The purpose of
these partial societies runs at variance with the concept of
the general will. Therefore they must be vetted, and the
people must be allowed to think.
In a society where it seems commonplace for the
averagecitizen to be alienated from politics by the power
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structures involved, who have vested interests in seeing the
survival of the status-quo, and think that low voter turnout
is a blessing, it is no wonder that the sovereign and the
general will suffer as they do. The people have very little
to inspire them into participation. Duty to some is as dirty
a word as its homophone that means waste. So there must
be something new and inspiring, or something so heinous
that even the apathetic can no longer afford to loaf around,
before anything can start to pull the country out of its funk.
We the People of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union, must dedicate ourselves to our democracy,
even when we disagree with it, because our disagreements
and actions stabilize the general will into a state where it
represents the people. This is a country for the people, by
the people, and of the people, and the people must fight to
keep it so. Otherwise it will continue sinking into a country for the Elephants, by the Donkeys, and of the lobbyists,
then all freedom will be lost.
Still, what is the write-in vote for anyway?
NOTES
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SJSU SYMPOSIUM

Aesthetics, Critical Theory, and Meaning(s):
Rejecting Hirsch's Defense ofAuthorial Intent
Scott Stroud

Assistant Editor
The issue of meaning is an extremely importantaspect
of hermeneutic inquiry and critical endeavors. Understanding a text and all of its overt and covert baggage hinges
upon some grasp of its meaning. The singularity of this
last statement, however, has been called into question by
literary, rhetorical, and critical theorists in the later parts of
the 20"' century. Is meaning truly objective such that one
can say he or she has the meaning of a certain text (art
included)? According to Hirsch's (1967) classic position
and those that follow his line of thought, the singular
meaning of a text can be located and surveyed by the critic
in the intent of the author. This school defends the author
from many segments of the critical community (hereafter
used to collectively refer to literary, rhetorical, cultural
studies, etc.) who wish to delineate the meaning of a text in
the various interpretations that can be drawn out of it using
various critical apparatuses. Thus, the battle over where
the intellectual property lines should be drawn in regard to
what the scholarly community means by the word "meaning" is initiated.
This paper wishes to join this debate by arguing that
Hirsch's conception of meaning is not only incorrect, but
also harmful. After explicating Hirsch's key concepts of
"meaning," "significance," and "validity," this paper will
argue that meaning cannot be confined to authorial intent
for a variety of reasons, paramount of which involves the
dialogic nature of meaning in relation to word use. Hirsch's
notions of communication/language use will be shown to
be rather simplistic and blind to issues of systemic influence. After this section, the risks of adopting Hirsch's
conceptualization of meaning in regard to the critical
project and its relation to the repressed "Others" of our

Scott Stroud

70

society-minorities and under-represented groups-will be
detailed. In all, this paper espouses the idea that it is more
heuristically valuable to leave criticism as an open enterprise, rather than closing it up to the interests of nondominant groups in the pursuit of a positivistic notion of
"True" meaning.
Hirsch's (1967) take on "meaning" seems to be
quite simple-"a text means what it author meant" (p. I).
The worry that motivates such a simplistic delineation of
the meaning of a text comes from Hirsch's concern over the
escalating disagreements throughout the critical word as to
what a certain text means. Thus, he advances the distinction between "meaning" and "significance" in an arbitrary
action designed to guide interpretive behavior and critical
thought. Putatively, Hirsch finds himself warranted in
positing this distinction because of the fruits it wiII bring to
the study of texts. At any rate, meaning is said to be "that
which is represented by a text; it is what the signs represent" (p.8). On the other hand, a text's significance is that
which "names a relationship between that meaning and a
person, or a conception, or a situation, or indeed anything
imaginable" (p. 8). Meaning is portrayed as that which the
author intends the piece to represent. This representation
appears to be mental, since Hirsch latter indicates that
"meaning is an affair of consciousness not of words . . .
There is no magic land of meanings outside human consciousness" (p. 4). The human mind is shown to have its
own intentionality, which it then connects to words and
transmits to a listener, etc.
Later on in this piece, however, Hirsh falls back to
words to standardize meaning. He acknowledges that "no
text can convey all the meanings an author had in mind as
he [sic] wrote" and that "the meanings I can convey
through discourse are more limited than the meanings I can
entertain [in my mind]" (p. 17). While he does not find
these admissions too damaging for his thesis of author
intention as equivalent to textual meaning, it does cause
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him to recast his definition of meaning as "the verbal
meaning which an author intends is accessible to the
interpreter of his [or her] text" (p. 18). The emerging
picture of meaning appears to be those authorial intentions
that can be adequately conveyed through language to any
receiver of his or her text. Any other reading of a text
would be consigned to its significance, not to its meaning
in Hirsch's system.
This division of significance and meaning, according
to Hirsch, allows for "objectively valid interpretation" (p.
3). This notion of validity is a standard or process, apparently, to which critics can appeal to resolve disagreements
and to discern the "true meaning" of a certain text. It is
along these lines that Hirsch laments, "once the author has
been ruthlessly banished as the determiner of his [or her]
text's meaning, it very gradually appeared that no adequate
principle existed for judging the validity of an interpretation" (p. 3). Thus, "one interpretation is as valid as another" (p. 3). The validity of an interpretation seems to
describe its reference to the actual semantic content of a
certain text; Hirsch states "validity implies the correspondence of an interpretation to a meaning which is represented by the text" (p. 10). The nature of this validity is
universal, as Hirsch looks for a type of interpretation that
ends all disputes concerning meaning. This proposed
method of ascertaining such an objective fit between
interpretation and text is offered in the form of authorial
intent quu verbalized authorial meaning. It is this method
and standard that the next sections will call into question on
argumentative and normative grounds.
This will raise objections to Hirsch's position on a
variety of grounds, the first being the internal incoherence
of his definition of meaning. As detailed above, Hirsch
finds (I) meaning is an issue of thoughts/cognitive states
(consciousness) and not mere symbols. Followingthis
intentionalist premise, comes (2) words cannot transmit all
meanings 01' cognitive activities within an author's mind.
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Hirsch admits this at a later point in his article, leading him
to formulate claim (3) one can only have access to verbalized (or verbalizablc) meanings/cognitive activities.
Hirsch ends his argument here, believing that universally
valid meanings of a text can be garnered from what the
author verbalizes about it. This, however, is not the true
conclusion of the argument. Instead, it should be stated
that (4) not all cognitive states/thoughts/meanings are
verbalizable, such as those involving emotional states,
.mystical feelings, etc. Hirsch admits this point, but doesn't
realize what he is admitting-he seems to take it that this
simply leads one to conclude with (3), sticking to purely
verbalizable meanings. However, the real conclusion of
this line of thought, if one wants a "logical" implication
and not an arbitrary decision rendered by Hirsch's rule, is
(5) therefore, not all authorial meanings can be conveyed or
discovered. The reason behind (5) ultimately appears to be
Hirsch's own reasoning, "meaning is an affair of consciousness not of words .. . There is no magic land of meanings
outside human consciousness" (p. 4). Adhering to this
process and line of thought defended by Hirsch would
seem to leave the "meaning" of a text forever in doubt as to
its completeness and comprehensiveness, as the author may
have meant something that is not conveyable in words.
Perhaps it is this "startling" insight that prompts individual
to paint a picture instead of writing what he or she wants to
convey to us. Much of what inspires art and what it means
cannot be simply verbalized or translated into non-problematic symbols.
Another major problem with Hirsch's formulation
of authorial intent as constitutive of meaning deals with
authorial intent not being conscious or accessible to the
author. Hirsch mentions the theories of Jungian psychology, but his theory wiJI be hard-pressed to refute such
concerns. This is because Hirsch, adhering to a very
simplistic notion of communication and transfer of ideas, is
committed to a linear process of cause and effect between
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author and audience. This model, generally ignored in
modern communication studies and psychology, posits an
idea "occurring" in the head of an author; this thought is
then put into a "linguistic vehicle" which speeds off into
the head of an audience member. If all of its passengers
disembark correctly into this new mind, the meaning has
been effectively transferred. One must notice the simple
lines of cause and effect; it is this aspect of the theory that
will allow Jungian, Freudian, and other psychological
concerns into the picture of criticism. Why, one may ask,
should Hirsch limit the causal sequence to starting at the
thought and ending with the receiver? Shouldn't causal
antecedents of the thought (or even contemporaneous with
the thought) be allowed into the picture? Indeed, Jung
(1958; 1976; 1980) and the school of thought that has
followed him posit archetypal and unconscious elements
that are important parts of the individual and that influence
what is said and how it is said. In short, the meaning of a
statement, like a dream, might not be only surface levelinstead, further reflection may be needed to allow the
author a comprehensive account of what he or she actually
meant through the creation and transmission of a certain
message. The artificial nature of Hirsch's account of
authorial intent is betrayed yet again; he wants a causal
account of meaning, but only certain causes portrayed as
the entire causal stimulus. Freud's (1965) psychology
would argue a similar line against Hirsch's position, claiming that myriad other unconscious or repressed causes may
be operating in a sufficient fashion to bring about the
production and valuation of an owned text. These issues
could be explored in greater depth, but the important point
is clear; Hirsch's criterion of meaning is not comprehensive
enough to exhaust the causal and cognitive reasons for
producing a text. II seems other, more critical methods that
Hirsch deplores, are necessitated by the impotence of
searching for verbalized authorial intent.
What Hirsch is missing in his analysis of language
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appears to be the dialogic turn that most modern descriptions of meaning have taken. His notion of meaning
follows a monologic model of communication that has
been critiqued by individualssuch as Haberrnas (1984;
1987). The intentionalist semantics he presupposes ignores
the communal nature of language and its effects on
thought. Habermas sees linguistic understanding as a
communal, shared endeavor. Language exists within
existing structures and systems, which in turn shape the
thoughts and possibilities accessible to individuals. Additionally, meaning for Habermas is consensual; terms and
claims are agreed or disagreed with before a given individual accepts them; thus, a simple "magic bullet" model of
communicative meaning such as Hirsh's ignores the back
and forth that occurs between a "sender" and a "receiver."
Both parties to communicative interaction are open to
changing their views and to defending/elaborating them if
necessary.
Extending this notion to issues of historicity, Gadamer
(1997) argues that understanding is not mere transmission
of a set idea. He states,
Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its
own way, for the text belongs to the whole tradition whose
content interest the age and in which it seeks to understand
itself . . . Not occasionally but always, the meaning of a
text goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is
not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity
as well. (p. 296)
Gadarner is arguing, in a similar vein to Habermas,
that the communicativesituation is less of a transaction and
more of a productive interaction. The receiver of a text
produces the meaning of it. While Hirsch emphasizes the
importance of shared linguistic codes, other concerns are
even more vital, such as the ideological schemes of the
respective cultures. This explains how the BhegevudGitu
can be given so many divergent (yet defensible) meanings
in contemporary society, ranging from non-dual interpreta-
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tions to extremely theistic readings. As an aside, one
should also note that there is no identifiable author for this
text, and no verbalized intentions for a person's writing it
have been put down in linguistic code.
The audience to a certain text does not simply
partake in that which the author wanted to get into their
heads; instead, they are the producers of that meaning in a
very real sense. McGee (1990), commenting on critical
rhetoric practice in the postmodern age, notes that in the
20lh century's burgeoning information revolution, it is the
audience that is the producer of texts in that the presented
speech, book, etc. is placed in relation to a transparent
"finished" discourse that is always already present. For
instance, Martin Luther King, 1r.'s speech, "I Have a
Dream," is a complete text but is more importantly a
fragment that the receptive audience must be accounted for
in relation to past discourse and future discourse/action.
What one makes of this speech is absolutely conditioned by
social conventions of language use (including such systemic influences of sexist, racist, and c1assist norms) and
what context one can draw from to give meaning to a man
speaking on racial issues in Washington. McGee describes
this polysemy of the text, which is necessitated by the
postmodern condition; he claims,
The communication revolution, however, was accompanied by a knowledge explosion ...The only way to 'say
it all' in our fractured culture is to provide readers/audiences with dense truncated fragments which cue them to
produce a finished discourse in their minds. In short, text

construction is now something done more by the consumers
thun by the producers of discourse. (p. 288)
The system of society and language use itself form a
matrix of meaning that far outstrips Hirsch's simple notion
of ideal translated in word, that is received by a listener and
translated into ideal again. The very life world that the
individuals live within structures their world, and accordingly should be analyzed by critics .
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It is at this point that a follower of Hirsch's ideas

could say, "but that is the significance of a text, not the
meaning." This retort highlights the extremely arbitrary
nature of this division; if masses of people read a text
differently, the Hirschian waves his or her hand and this
ceases to be meaning and instead becomes significance.
The preceding arguments attempted to decry this conception of meaning as logically suspect; the following section
will ask, "why should we define meaning in such a way?"
NormativeReasons against equating Meaning with
Authorial Intent
Hirsch's admittedly normativedistinction between
meaning and significance is an attempt to scientize interpretation; indeed, he worries about the state of the academy
that produces so many conflicting interpretations. It seems
that he believes that "good" and "valid" interpretations can
be had if the criterion of verbalized authorial intent is
agreed upon as the standard of a correct interpretation. In
this author's opinion, this seems to relegate critical studies
to the role of an intellectual sherecroppet; sure, they can
"farm" all of "their" land of textual significance, but when
it comes down to the heart of the matter, the intention of
the author is what really controls the beliefs and actions of
the people. What critical scholars are pointing out is the
significance, not the meaningof a text. Hopefully, the
reader will notice the condescending and hierarchical tone
of that last statement. Judgments and power relationships
are enshrined by Hirsch's criterion, and this section will
argue why this structure of power is normatively harmful.
The first concern over the criterion of authorial
intent is epistemological; how does one go about finding
out what the author intended? Hirsch anticipates this issue
as a purely logically attack, and falls back to "verbalized"
authorial meaning. Is the method so simple as to ask the
author to write or tell us what he or she meant by a text?
How many words are allowed in such a methodology?
Surely, many "meanings" will be simple to describe and
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many will be beyond worlds. Even with this characterization, the worry brought up by Tyson (1999) is important;
texts with authors who are long since deceased may lack all
"meaning" simply due to our inability to I) talk to the
author and 2) read (i.e., interpret) any textual evidence
from the author about what the author intended text X to
mean. It is foolish to say such texts lack a meaning, but do
have significance; such a criterion of meaning would
discourage systematic textual analysis of ideology, etc. and
instead focus efforts on historical research, craning for a
fragment of an author's intention so that critics can finally
reveal to the world what a text "means." Another problematic concern for Hirsch is texts that lack an author (such as
the Bhuguvud GitCl) ; does the scholarly community give up
on such texts since there is no way to discern what they
mean?
A more serious and unanticipated objection to
Hirsch also stems from this epistemological concern. If the
discovery of the "meaning " of a text is to come from
authorial verbalization, then the majority of authors (long
since dead) will necessitate historical research. Even
authors of repressed classes are affected, as they lack an
adequate voice in society to air their intention behind their
texts. One must ask, who has the power and privilege in
such a scheme? The answer should be fairly obvious. For
much of recorded "history" in the European world, those
that have recorded history have been privileged white
males. Thus, the historical record excludes the experience
and thoughts of people of color and the female gender.
Tyson (1999) writes "Even when traditional historians
believe that they arc sticking to the facts, the way they
contextualized those facts (including which facts are
deemed important enough to report and which are left out)
determines what stories those facts will tell" (p. 279). The
historian, the individual whom the critic must rely upon to
discern the authorial intention behind a text, is making an
interpretation when he or she "reports " what happened in
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the past. In most cases (since most authors of texts are
dead or will be dead), the meaning of a text is simply
another interpretation at the hands of those who record
what an individual meant and what documents are preserved/translated. What we know of the past is related to
what our society values and what it wants to erase, either
intentionally or through neglect.
The relationship between "history" (as recorded)
and the "Other" of minority races and cultures is captured
poignantly by Hall (1991). He points out, "History
changes your conception of yourself. Thus, another critical
thing about identity is that it is partly the relationship
between you and the Other ... Racism is a structure of
discourse and representation that tried to expel the Other
symbolically-blot it out, put it over there in the Third
World, at the margin" (p. 16). Our culture has historically
defined itself based upon the te/os of white European
experience; the records of the other have either been neglected in toto or symbolically altered to suit specific
agendas of power. For instance, how our history books
portray the Native Americans, African tribes, and colonized
peoples in general can serve an important function in
legitimating programs of violence or, at the other extreme,
providing the illusion that they did not occur. Indeed, the
experience of oppressed individuals, when included in the
historical canon, is often compromised by an "outsider"
perspective; Said (1978) writes,
Since the Orientals cannot represent themselves, they
must therefore be represented by others who know more
about Islam than Islam knows about itself ...Note that
there is no question of an exchange between Islam's views
and an outsiders: no dialogue, no discussion, no mutual
recognition. There is a flat assertion of quality, which the
Western policy maker, or his faithful servant, possesses by
virtue of his being Western, Shite, non-Muslim. (p. 97)
The researcher, if he or she assumes that his or her
research can adequately capture and report the experience
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of an Other is often mistaken; it is this attitude that Wood
and Cox (1993) warn about in relation to such issues as
relational violence. Who reports the battered female's
experience? Who produces the "evidence" from which
policy decisions can be made as "true" or "false?" In
relation to the "universal" meaning of any given text, who
gives the text to the public and who hides other texts?
Which authors get to verbalize their intentions? Who does
the translating? Who records, preserves, and refers to these
material traces of the historical record? Questions such as
this have lead literary studies away from positing certain
"universal meaning" in canonical texts, as it becomes
apparent that "a text's 'universality' was determined by,
and thus too often limited to, while male American experience" (Tyson, 1999, p. 151). These concerns of power and
oppression are not petty concernstcontra Hirsch's simplistic notion of meaning, I argue that a more complex and
open conception of meaning would allow for such concerns
of power and powerlessness to enter into the critical
agenda. When the scholarly community begins to privilege
certain people with access to "valid" meaning, efforts to
expose such ideology and power should be redoubled.
What Hirsch perceives as a paralyzing diversity of critical
interpretations, I, along with Wilson, Flores, and Hasian
(J 993), find this plenum of readings to be a beneficial
expose of the various levels of meaning and ideology
within a specific text.
Another aspect to this dangerous installation of
universally valid meaning in the normative standard of
verbalized authorial intent comes from the audiences and
viewpoints it privileges. When a text has a "universally
valid" meaning that precludes other "meanings" and instead assigns them to mere "significance," power is flexed
over oppositional readings. The theories of Bakhtin emphasize this point. Emerson (1994) describes Bakhtin's
rejection of formalism, the notion that one "true" meaning
exists for a given text. She states,
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During those rigidly Stalinist years, so saturated with
approved prototypes, Bakhtin seems to have feared the
potential tyranny of perfect form, the immutability and
uninteruptability of any icon that was too fixed in place"
(p.212)
This quotation provides the background for Bakhtin's
thought and the concern it had with issues of power; while
the contemporary society we inhabit does not overtly abuse
power as Stalin's regime did, one must remain vigilant
against stifling discourse and audiences with the possession
of "universally valid meaning." Hirsch's conception of
language as an ideal transmitter of the comprehensible
currency of thoughts/intentions is labeled by Bakhtin as a
"unitary language." In discussing the dangers of this conception of language, Bakhtin (1981) talks of
Language not as a system of abstract grammatical
categories, but rather . .. as ideologically saturated, language as worldview, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a
maximum of mutual understanding in all spheres of ideologicallife . Thus a unitary language gives expression to
forces working toward concrete verbal and ideological
unification and centralization, which develop in vital
connection with the processes of sociopolitical and cultural
centralization. (p. 271)
Language is not the mere means to understand an
author's intention; this very orientation toward one answer
to end all debate over meaning is the danger itself. Opposed to Hirsch's fears over too much discussion and too
many interpretations of texts, one should truly be concerned with his centralizing rhetoric-the search for "universally valid" and "objective" meanings that stifle others'
opinions of textual meaning. To assume that the words are
transparent only to the author's intended meaning misses
the point of Bakhtin's critic; instead, "these words [the
author's] are embedded in a history that transcends the
speaker's intentions, the words necessarily represent more
than the author intends. In this larger context, the author is
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a kind of 'character: who is contained within and defined
by the communicative structure over which he or she has
only limited control" (Garvey, 2000, p. 379). The author
and the language he or she uses are always already imbedded in a social fabric that limits their choices of thought
and action; any transparency that the words of the author
possess (either in the text or in other texts such as interviews) is forced upon it from a position of power. Garvey
continues, "Transparency must be forced on the sign by
arbitrary social power. This is partly so because the consensus that validates transparency . .. is more likely to
mark the ascendance of the centripetal over centrifugal
forces of language than it is to signify the victory of reason
over power" (p. 380).
The consensus Hirsch wants through the arbitrary
criterion of verbalized author intent comes at too high of a
price-the shunning of alternate voices that may challenge
the elite structures inherent in society, its texts, and its
linguistic artifacts. The search for such a "science" of
interpretation risks crushing the oppositional readings of
texts that allow them to be empowering for oppressed
individuals and groups; if one privileged author is allowed
to describe the meaning of a certain work for all time's
sake, all other uses of it become lecherous and draining
instead of new invigorated instantiationsof different meanings for different groups. The centralizing urge to quell
discourse for the sake of consensus begs the questions, who
has the power and who can decide what criterion should be
used?
Hirsch brings up some interesting reasons why the
author should not be ignored in criticism; instead of stopping at such an inclusive point, he goes too far in restricting
meaning solely to verbalized authorial intent. The sad fact
of the matter is that Hirsch sees critical studies in light of
the prevailing scientific views of his time; his rhetoric and
use of metaphors betray his search for an end to dialogue
through the force of "universally valid" meanings. This
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paper has argued that such a search' is doomed to failure
and should not even be attempted because of the abusive
results it empowers. Hirsch's approach employs a naive
model of communication that ignores the complexity of the
textual/contextual situation; indeed, in one of his counterarguments for authorial intent, he focuses on the argument
for psychological change in the author, and admittedly
ignores "the radical historicist view" (p. I) of changing
meanings for changing periods. What Hirsch ignores is
what modern inquiry has studied in depth-the role of the
society and socializing institutions in affecting meaning
and the very use of language. Unfortunately, these
postmodern sensibilities are absent from Hirsch's stand,
~hich takes positivistic strains from science and yearns for
such "certainty" in textual studies. It would be interesting
to speculate on who is empowered by such an approach;
beside the dominant classes who control the historical
record, what traditions would approve of such a criterion
(or indeed the very search for such a criterion)'! Perhaps
those in search of never changing, revealed dogma in
sacred texts would applaud such an attempt to "get it right
and then move on." So I end this rebuttal to Hirsch with .
this plea-let al I the voices be heard and never assume
there is an end to the dialogue. That end would imply
power and the cessation of discourse, and that is an actuality that must never be realized. For in discourse comes
novelty and new perspectives, and all texts continually
possess new perspectives to reveal about what they say and
about who we are. Questing for the meaning of a text is
not only futile, but also dangerous to our knowledge of our
society and what it could be in the future.
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